Market definition and free online services: the prospect of personal data as price by Eben, Magali
\  
 
 
 
 
 
Eben, M.  (2018) Market definition and free online services: the prospect of 
personal data as price. I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information 
Society, 14(2), pp. 227-281. http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/202096/ 
 
 
The material cannot be used for any other purpose without further 
permission of the publisher and is for private use only. 
 
There may be differences between this version and the published version. 
You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from 
it.  
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/202096/  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Deposited on 10 February 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of       
           Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk  
 
  
0 
 
Market Definition and Free Online Services: The Prospect of Personal 
Data as Price 
Magali Eben 
School of Law, University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom 
 
The author is a PhD candidate and teaching assistant at the University of Leeds. She is 
writing her doctoral thesis on market definition for online services under the supervision of 
Prof. Pinar Akman and Prof. Peter Whelan. She holds a University Research Scholarship, 
provided for the duration of her PhD research by the University of Leeds. 
This is the version pre-publication.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 
 
 
MARKET DEFINITION AND FREE ONLINE SERVICES: THE PROSPECT 
OF PERSONAL DATA AS PRICE 
 
ABSTRACT 
When online services are offered for ‘free’ to a group of users, the traditional price-based 
tools of market definition. If there is no price, there can be no market. This paper aims to 
address this problem through a thought experiment: what if the ‘price’ paid by users is not 
money, but personal data. If users approach personal data as a medium of exchange, their 
sensitivity to increased demands of personal data could be used to measure demand-side 
substitutability. In that case, personal data may be incorporated as the price in the SSNIP test. 
This article establishes the first steps in this thought experiment, acknowledging both its 
limitations and its potential. 
Antitrust; market definition; online services; personal data; price 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Market definition is an essential part of antitrust law. When companies are penalized for their 
behavior, it is because their actions have been found to restrict competition within a certain 
market. The delineation of that market has important consequences for companies, affecting 
whether they are considered dominant, or whether their agreements are deemed anti-
competitive. Google, the world’s biggest search provider, is experiencing this first-hand: the 
European Commission ordered it to pay a staggering fine of 2.42 billion euro for abusing its 
dominant position in the ‘general search market’.1 But this market definition has been the 
source of criticism, however as it arguably disregards key features of the industry in which 
Google operates. 2  Internet businesses have specific traits which render the application of 
existing principles of market definition more complicated: expanded geographical boundaries, 
decreased marginal costs, multi-sided markets and network effects. Market definition is 
particularly challenging when online services offer some of their products for free. As the 
traditional tools of market definition rely heavily on price, the question arises how the market 
for these services can be defined in the absence of a monetary price. This challenge arises 
world-wide: variations of a price-based test (like the SSNIP3 test) are adopted in many 
jurisdictions to define markets and assess market power.4  
Trying to fit free online services into traditional price-based tests may seem like 
attempting to square a circle: if no money is exchanged, no price is paid, and a market cannot 
be defined. To overcome this challenge, this paper rethinks the idea of price. It explores the 
 
1 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1784_en.htm 
2 James D. Ratliff and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Is There a Market for Organic Search Engine Results and Can Their 
Manipulation Give Rise to Antitrust Liability?, 10(3) Journal of Competition Law and Economics 517, 518 
(2014); Florence Thépot, Market Power in Online Search and Social Networking: A Matter of Two-Sided 
Markets, 36(2) World Competition 195, 196 (2013). 
3 ‘Small but significant non-transitory increase in price’. 
4 Chapter 2 Market Definition in INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, MERGER GUIDELINES 
(2004), available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc562.pdf (hereinafter 
‘ICN Guidelines’); Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev. [OECD], Policy Roundtable on Market Definition, 11 
(2012). 
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possibility of conceptualizing personal data as the price consumers pay for free online 
services, for the purpose of market definition. 'Data is the currency of the 21st Century' has 
become a catchphrase, invoking a futuristic image of consumers wielding ‘personal data’ 
credit cards at every cash register. Although personal data is not (and will probably never be) 
the common currency of modern society, that notion may not be as far-fetched as it sounds. 
Consumers routinely act as the providers of an important input of businesses of the digital 
economy: personal data. In return for providing this input they obtain access to services for 
which they would otherwise pay a monetary fee. As the collection of personal data becomes 
more common and consumer awareness grows, the sensitivity of consumers to the amount of 
personal data demanded could increase. As a result, consumers who feel they are not getting 
value for their money, or more accurately 'value for their personal data' may switch to other 
services. In that case, personal data as a price could be used as a measure of demand-side 
substitutability, and thus as a part of market definition. 
Two jurisdictions have inspired this paper: the United States of America and the 
European Union. Not only have both jurisdictions adopted the SSNIP test as part of market 
definition, but the U.S. and the EU are closely linked: consumers and businesses on the 
Internet increasingly interact, regardless of geographical boundaries between America and 
Europe. This is illustrated by the recent Google case: an American Internet company is the 
subject of scrutiny in Europe for objections which were dismissed in America. The growth of 
the Internet means that these two jurisdictions will increasingly be fighting comparable 
battles. Market definition will need to be performed for similar companies in a similar 
environment on both sides of the Atlantic. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, the notion of ‘free’ will be analyzed, as 
well as its challenges for competition law practice. The second part will explore the concept 
of market definition, its basic concepts and application, as well as its shortcomings. The third 
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part will evaluate the notion of personal data as price, beginning with a definition of 'tradable 
personal data' (or TPD) and a definition of price as a certain amount demanded of a medium 
of exchange. Subsequently, the requirements will be set out which personal data needs to 
satisfy to be a medium of exchange. Specific attention will be given to the requirements of 
acceptability and of value, as these appear the most difficult to fulfil with regard to personal 
data. The implementation of personal data as price into the hypothetical monopolist test will 
be discussed in the fourth part. All of this leads to the conclusion that despite the current 
imperfection of personal data as price, it is an interesting alternative to market definition in 
markets where no monetary price exists. This paper aims to demonstrate that rapid changes in 
society need not be an obstacle to legal decision-making. With the necessary flexibility and 
creativity, traditional tools can become modern solutions. 
 
II. THE NOTION OF FREE AND MARKET DEFINITION 
A. ‘Free’ on the Internet 
Google, Amazon, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube… Everyone knows these names and what 
they stand for. The companies who own these websites have almost become synonymous 
with the Internet. They provide search, social networking and video streaming services; they 
enable increased access to information; and they connect those who would have found it hard 
to find each other in the ‘offline’ world. They have opened up what seems like endless 
possibilities for many in the 21st Century. And what is more, these services are completely 
free! Or, at least, that is how it seems. No money exchanges hands, no credit card details are 
provided. This lack of price has baffled authorities around the world for quite some time, 
with some courts arguing that there cannot be a market if there is no price. Yet, the 
companies offering these services are not charities, they are out to make a profit. A monetary 
price may not be exchanged, but something else is: users of the service may provide 
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‘attention’ to advertising, or provide their personal data.5 The type of ‘free’ service which is 
offered to consumers in order to generate advertising revenue is not exclusive to the online 
world. It was, and to some extent still is, prevalent in traditional media such as television 
broadcasting.6 There is no monetary exchange between content provider and consumer, but 
there is an economic exchange: consumers provide access to themselves.7 In the words of 
Newman, users literally ‘pay’ attention to advertising, thus signaling the existence of a 
market in which an exchange takes place.8 Examples include Google Search, which offers 
users access to its search engine at no monetary cost, but subjects users to targeted 
advertisement, or Amazon, which started offering its advertising-supported Kindle Fire 
Tablets at a discount. Consumers also frequently give up their personal data for the use of 
services. As Lanier puts it, ‘it has become commonplace to expect online services to be given 
for free, or rather, in exchange for acquiescence to be spied on’. 9 Some price comparison 
sites, for example, collect and resell consumers personal data in exchange for the use of their 
sites.10 It can be argued that services are not truly ‘free’ when they are provided in exchange 
for something. The provision of free goods and services raises some interesting issues for 
competition law practice. Traditional tools were designed around competition on price, an 
easy factor to quantify.11 When a product is free, the price dimension authorities have come 
 
5 Michael S. Gal and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Hidden Costs of Free Goods: Implication for Antitrust 
Enforcement, 80 Antitrust L.J. 521, 527 (2016); Chris Jay Hoofnagle and Jan Whittington, Free: Accounting for 
the Costs of the Internet’s Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 606, 608 and 626 (2014); John Newman, 
Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets, 164 U. Pa L. Rev, 165 (2015); CHRIS ANDERSON, FREE: THE FUTURE 
OF A RADICAL PRICE, 12 and 20 (Hyperion Books 2009). 
6 C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 (2) Ohio State Law Journal 311, 319 (1997); Ellen P. 
Goodman, Media Policy Out of the Box: Content Abundance, Attention Scarcity, and the Failures of Digital 
Markets, 19 (4) Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1389, 1424 (2004); Jean J. Gabszewicz, Joana Resende and 
Nathalie Sonnac, Media as Multi-Sided Platfoms 8 in ROBERT G. PICARD and STEVEN S. WILDMAN 
(eds.), HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF THE MEDIA (Edward Elgar 2015). 
7 Europe Economics, Market Definition in the Media Sector – Economic Issues – Report for the European 
Commission, DG Competition 44 (2002). 
8 Newman J, supra note 5, 171. 
9 JARON LANIER, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE?, 10 (Simon & Schuster 2013).  
10 http://www.beatthatquote.com/; http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1375066/Beware-company-
websites-selling-personal-details.html. 
11 Gal and Rubinfeld, supra note 5, 30; Fabio Polverino, Hunting the Wild Geese: Competition Analysis in a 
World of ‘Free’, Concorrenza e Mercato 545, 548 (2012). 
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to rely on falls away. 12 It has been argued that if there is no price, there can be no abuse: a 
zero price means that there are no monopoly overcharges and thus no harm to consumers.13 
Yet it is important to realize that not all zero priced products are actually ‘free’: when 
consumers provide something in return, they do provide a ‘payment’, in attention, or in 
personal data. When consumers incur such costs, this is a signal that a market exists.14  
Companies offering ‘free’ goods have risen to prominence in the recent past, forcing a 
rethinking of the price theory in which market definition is rooted.15 The next parts will give 
an overview of the theoretical concepts and conventional methods of market definition, 
before discussing the problem of price for online services. 
B. The Use of Market Definition 
Market definition is a universal tool, adopted in many jurisdictions to determine the 
boundaries within which to assess market power and the effects on competition.16  It is 
consistently acknowledged in the U.S.17 and the EU18 as a critical tool in competition law 
assessments, allowing for the identification of primary competitive constraints. Defining a 
 
12 Aleksandra Gebicka and Andreas Heinemann, Social Media and Competition Law, 37(2) World Competition 
149, 154 (2014); Miguel Sousa Ferro, “Ceci n’est pas un marché”: Gratuity and Competition Law, 1 
Concurrences 70679, 18 (2015); David Stallibrass and Sharon Pang, Clash of Titans: How China Disciplines 
Internet Markets, 6 J. Eur. Competition L. and Prac. 418, 419 (2015). 
13 Ferro, supra note 12, 29; Robert H. Bork, Antitrust and Google (Apr. 6, 2012), 
http://hudson.org/research/8861-antitrust-and-google; Nathan Newman, Search, Antitrust and the Economics of 
the Control of User Data, 31 (2) Yale J. on Reg., 401, 412 (2014); Kinderstart.com LLC v Google, Inc. Case No. 
C 06-2057 JF (RS) (N.D. Ca., March 16, 2007). 
14 Newman N, supra note 13, at 415. 
15 Newman N, supra note 13, 446; Polverino supra note 11, 3; Maurice E. Stucke and Allen P. Grunes, No 
Mistake about It: The Important Role of Antitrust in the Era of Big Data 6 (Antitrust Source April 2015, 
University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 269, 2015): Thépot, supra note 2, 216. 
16 OECD, supra note 4, 21. 
17 United States v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours and Co. (1956) 353 U. S. 586, 353 U. S. 593; Alcoa Case United 
States v. Aluminum Co. of America (1964)  377 U.S. 271; U.S. Dep’t of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines 7 (2010), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf (hereinafter ‘DOJ and FTC 
Merger Guidelines’). 
18 Case 27/76, United Brands Company and United Brands Continental BV v. Commission, [1978] ECR 207, 
§10; Case 31/80, L’Oreal v De Nieuwe AMCK, [1980] E.C.R. 3775, §25; Case 62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. 
Commission, [1991] E.C.R. I-3359, §51; Case T-62/98, Volkswagen v. Commission, [2000] ECR II-2707, § 
230; Case T-68/96, Kish Glass and CO Ltd v Commission, [2001] ECR II-1885, §62; ); European Commission, 
Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market for Purposes of Community Competition Law (C 372/5) (1997) 
(hereinafter ‘EU Comm. Notice Market Definition’). 
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relevant market involves the delineation of two dimensions:19 the geographic market and the 
product market.20 This paper focusses on the product market, which consists of those goods 
or services that compete with each other to satisfy consumers’ needs. The question which is 
asked, when determining the product market, is whether goods or services are 
interchangeable (‘substitutable’) from the point of view of consumers (and sometimes, from 
the point of view of suppliers). 21 To put it in economic terms, the product market is found 
through an assessment of demand-side substitutability. 22   Demand-side substitutability is 
particularly important due to the substantial competitive constraint that arises from 
consumers who are prepared to switch to other products. The possibility of demand-side 
substitutability cautions an undertaking not to increase the price because it is unlikely that the 
increase would be profitable. If the price of a product goes up, consumers switch to 
alternatives that they consider substitutes, thus causing a loss in sales because the decrease in 
output is more important than the increase in unit price margin.23  
Demand-side substitutability has been conceptualized through the ‘Hypothetical 
Monopolist Test’ (HMT), developed in the U.S. by the Department of Justice and the Federal 
Trade Commission. 24 It has been widely accepted throughout various jurisdictions, including 
 
19 In some cases, authorities take into account a third dimension, the temporal market, when time has a specific 
effect on the market, such as in the case of season specific fruit, for example. We will not address this dimension 
here. 
20 WHISH and BAILEY, COMPETITION LAW, 30 (OUP 2012); ROBERT O’DONOGHUE and JORGE PADILLA, THE 
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ARTICLE 102 TFEU, 95 (Hart Publishing 2nd ed. 2013); BISHOP and WALKER, THE 
ECONOMICS OF EC COMPETITION LAW: CONCEPTS, APPLICATION, AND MEASUREMENT, 113 (Sweet and Mawell 
3rd ed. 2010). 
21 DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines, supra note 17, 7; United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 351 
U.S. 377, 395 (1956); United States v. Aluminum Co. of  Am., 377 U.S. 271, 276–77 (1964); EU Comm. Notice 
Market Definition, supra note 18, §7; Case 6/72, Europemballage Co. and Continental Can Co. v. Commission 
of the European Communities, [1973] Common Market Law Reports I99,  §32; Case 27/76 United Brands 
Company and United Brands Continental BV v. Commission, [1978] ECR 207, §22. 
22 EU Comm. Notice Market Definition, supra note 18, §14; Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An 
Analytical Overview, 74 Antitrust L.J. 129, 134 (2007). 
23 WHISH and BAILEY, supra note 20, 31; O’DONOGHUE and PADILLA, supra note 20, 100; BISHOP and WALKER, 
supra note 20, 118. 
24 BISHOP and WALKER, supra note 20, 111; Malcolm B. Coate and Jeffrey H. Fischer, A Practical Guide to the 
Hypothetical Monopolist Test for Market Definition, 4 (4) J. Competition L. and Econ. 1031, 1035 (2008); DOJ 
and FTC Merger Guidelines, supra note 17, 8. 
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the EU, where it has become part of the Notice on Market Definition.25 Under the HMT, a 
market consists of a good or service, or a group of goods or services, on which a hypothetical 
undertaking, which is both the present and future seller, wishing to maximize its profits and 
not subject to price regulations, could impose a significant and lasting price increase. In 
essence, it seeks to determine the narrowest market on which a hypothetical monopolist could 
exercise its market power. Thus, the relevant market is the smallest market worth 
monopolizing. 26 The most direct implementation of this concept is the SSNIP test, which 
stands for ‘Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price’. It reformulates the 
concept of the HMT into a test, by asking the following: ‘If the undertaking in question were 
to introduce a SSNIP, would customers switch to other products or services in a manner that 
makes the price increase unprofitable?’ The SSNIP test broadly consists of four steps. First 
the candidate market will be determined, which essentially consists of the products or 
services offered by the undertaking in question. Second, it will be assessed whether a SSNIP 
will induce consumers to switch to such an extent that makes the increase unprofitable. If it 
does not, the test will end here: this is the relevant market. If it does, the third step will be to 
broaden the market to include those ‘next-best substitutes’ the consumers have switched to. 
Then the ‘last’ step will be to repeat the whole process.27 These four steps amount to a study 
of demand-side substitutability.  
The second of these steps – the assessment of whether it is profitable to apply a 
SSNIP – requires more clarification. Firstly, an increase in price is considered small but 
significant if it is a 5 to 10% increase. 28 Secondly, the increase should be non-transitory and 
 
25 Safinaz Mohd Hussein, Nazura Abdul and Mahmud Zuhdi Mohd Nor, Market Definition and Market Power 
as Tools for the Assessment of Competition, 13 (2) Int’l J. Bus. and Soc’y 163, 171 (2012). 
26 O’DONOGHUE and PADILLA, supra note 20, at 108; BISHOP and WALKER, supra note 20, 111; Coate and 
Fischer, supra note 24, 1035. 
27 O’DONOGHUE and PADILLA, supra note 20, 110; WHISH and BAILEY, supra note 20, 31; Coate and Fischer, 
supra note 24, 1036. 
28 BISHOP and WALKER, supra note 20, 115; O’DONOGHUE and PADILLA, supra note 20, 110; WHISH and 
BAILEY, supra note 20, 32; EU Comm. Notice Market Definition, supra note 18, §17; DOJ and FTC Merger 
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thus permanent or at least stable for a significant period of time. Lastly, assessing whether a 
SSNIP would be profitable requires empirical data. It may be that past occurrences have 
illustrated that such an increase would or would not be profitable. Previous shocks in the 
market due to entry or exits, changes in output, quality, marketing policy or costs may 
illustrate this sufficiently, after discarding external factors. This is what Coate and Fischer 
call the use of ‘natural experiments.’ 29 Another way of assessing the profitability of a price 
increase is the ‘critical loss analysis.’ 30 The critical loss is the loss of sales that would result 
in a SSNIP having no net effect on profits. If the actual loss of sales resulting from the SSNIP 
is greater than the critical loss, the price increase is unprofitable. Or put differently, the 
SSNIP is unprofitable if customers desert to substitutes to such an extent that the profit 
margin per unit sold does not make up for the loss of output in total.31 As the market is 
broadened to include more demand substitutes a point will eventually be reached at which a 
hypothetical monopolist could impose a SSNIP because there are no longer enough demand 
substitutes to which consumers could turn. There would no longer be other products 
constraining the hypothetical monopolist from increasing its price. This is the end of the 
assessment: the relevant market has been found.32 
C. The Problem of Price 
A summary glance at the market definition tests immediately reveals a problem: the tests 
require the existence of a price. Yet, many online services are offered to users for ‘free’. How 
 
Guidelines, supra note 17, 10 (Guidelines do caution that what constitutes a small but significant increase may 
vary depending on the specific industry and thus even fall below 5%). 
29 Coate and Fischer, supra note 24, 1044. 
30 O’DONOGHUE and PADILLA, supra note 20, at 111; David S. Evans, Lightening Up on Market Definition, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW 53, 70 (Einer Elhauge 2012); Baker, supra note 
22, 154; Coate and Fischer, supra note 24, 1040. Cases with Critical Loss Analysis: FTC v Occidental 
Petroleum Corp. (1986-1) Trade caas. 67,071 DDC April 29 1986 at 62-513 and FTC v Swedish Match 131 F. 
Supp. 2d 151, 161*162 DDC 2000. 
31 There is a  trade-off: the price-cost margins increase to those customers who continue to purchase from the 
undertaking, but the undertaking loses the entire price-cost margin it would previously have received from those 
customers who are now buying elsewhere (Baker, supra 22, 142) 
32 BISHOP and WALKER, supra note 20, 116; Coate and Fischer, supra note 24, 1040; O’DONOGHUE and 
PADILLA, supra note 20, 111. 
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can a market be defined through consumers’ reactions to price increases if there is no price?33 
Authorities and scholars have argued that competition law cannot be applied to zero-price 
products: without a price there can be no market, no market power, and no anticompetitive 
effects.34  In the KinderStart case, an American court declared that antitrust law does not 
‘concern itself with competition in the provision of free services’ and that Google or any 
other search provider does not ‘sell its search services’. 35 This validity of this can be disputed. 
An important part of services on the Internet are offered for free, by undertakings who run 
profitable businesses. ‘Free’ should not always be taken to mean ‘for nothing’. In some 
business models the user is asked to provide something in return for the service, such as 
personal data, which the undertaking can monetize. 36  Furthermore, competition has not 
disappeared merely because the undertakings offer their product for ‘free’. Antitrust 
enforcement – and thus market definition – remains possible. If no monetary price is charged, 
it is necessary to find alternatives to the traditional application of the SSNIP test to define the 
market.37 This paper puts forward such an alternative, and begs the reader to consider that 
consumers do pay a price for the services: the price of personal data. Conceptualizing 
personal data as a ‘price’ would enable the assessment of demand-side substitutability, by 
determining whether consumers are sensitive to increases in the personal data collected, 
inducing them to switch to other products they consider substitutes. This analysis can be 
performed through the SSNIP test, by fitting ‘personal data as price’ within the confines of 
the test. In order for personal data to be a price for the purposes of the SSNIP test, it is 
 
33 German MONOPOLKOMMISION [Monopolies Commission], COMPETITION POLICY: THE CHALLENGE OF 
DIGITAL MARKETS 25 (Special report 68, 2015). 
34 Ferro, supra note 12, 14; Newman J, supra note 5, 161; Stucke and Grunes, supra note 15, 6; Kagan, Bricks, 
Mortar, and Google: Defeining the Relevant Antitrust Market for Internet-Based Companies, 55 N.Y. L. Sch. L. 
Rev. 271, 277 (2010); Nicolo Zingales, Product Market Definition in Online Search and Advertising, 9(1) 
Competition L. Rev. 33 (2013). 
35 Kinderstart.com LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-3057 JF(RS), 2007 WL 831806 (N.D. Cal. 2007) § 5. 
36 Graef, supra note 13, 474; Newman J, supra note 5, 152 and 165. 
37 Some suggestions have included the replacement of price by quality, thus measuring not a  SSNIP but a  
SSNDQ (small but significant non-transitory decrease in quality) (Gebicka and Heinemann, supra note 12, 156), 
or the integration of two-sided market analysis into the market definition, trying to find a common measurement 
for the prices on both sides (Zingales, supra note 34, 33).   
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necessary to define what is meant by price and whether personal data fulfils this definition. 
This will be considered in the next part. In assessing these definitions, it is essential to 
remember the scope of this thought experiment: the feasibility of can personal data as a ‘price’ 
for the purpose of assessing demand-side substitutability. This requires a micro view of 
consumers and their potential approach to personal data in B2C relationships. The paper does 
not provide a macro analysis of the role of data in all economic relationships. 
III. PERSONAL DATA AS PRICE 
A. Introduction and Definitions 
The definition of ‘free’ in the dictionary is that something does not ‘cost anything’, comes 
free of ‘charge’. 38  Although seemingly straightforward, this definition is ambiguous. The 
common assumption is that ‘free’ signifies that something comes without the need for 
financial payment, but this need not be so. A ‘charge’ or a ‘cost’ can refer to an ‘amount of 
money’ or to ‘something given to get a particular thing’. 39 So when someone tells you that an 
online service can be used ‘for free’, it may be worth asking: “what kind of free do you 
mean?” Often, online services do not require money, and so call themselves ‘free’, whilst at 
the same time collecting personal data on its users. It can be argued, although no money 
changes hands, that a price is being paid: the personal data is that price. This argument is the 
premise on which the following thought experiment is based. Thus, attention to the concrete 
meaning of this hypothesis is warranted, with particular consideration of the understanding of 
the concepts ‘personal data’ and ‘price’.  
 
38 ‘Free’ in Cambridge Dictionary online, available at http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/free, 
accessed 21 December 2017; ‘free’ in Oxford Living Dictionary online, available at 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/free , accessed 21 December 2017. 
39 ‘Charge’ in Cambridge Dictionary online, available at 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/charge, accessed 21 December 2017; ‘cost’ in Cambridge 
Dictionary online, available at http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/cost, accessed 21 December 
2017; ‘charge’ in Oxford Living Dictionary, available at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/charge, 
accessed 21 December 2017; ‘cost’ in Oxford Living Dictionary, available at 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/cost, accessed 21 December 2017.  
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Personal data is widely defined as any information relating to an identified, i.e. 
distinguishable as an individual from other members of a group, or identifiable natural 
person.40 This information may relate to an individual in several ways, making him directly 
or indirectly identifiable. The category ‘indirectly’ refers to information which may not 
directly reveal the identity of the data subject, but allows for his identification by 
combination with other pieces of information.41 The OECD specifically lists the following 
categories of personal data: 
 
• User generated content (blogs, comments, photos, videos);  
 
• Social data (contacts on social networks);  
 
• Activity or behavioral data (search terms, browsing history, purchases…);  
 
• Locational data (including IP address);  
 
40 EU: Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 1995 O.J. (L 
281) 31; Article 2(a) of Regulation 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the 
free movement of such data, 2001 O.J. (L 8) 1; Article 4 of Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (applicable from  25 May 2018) (hereinafter GDPR); Article 3 
of Directive 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the 
free movement of such data, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 89 (to be transposed by EU Member States by 6 May 2018); 
Opinion of the Article 29 Data Protection Authority Working Party on the Concept of Personal Data, 2007 
4/2007, 7. U.S. data protection laws do not use a similar definition; however, the U.S. Code contains 
references to the identifiability of the individual (the  term  ‘‘record’’  means  any  item,  collection,  or  
grouping  of  information  about  an individual  that  is  maintained  by  an  agency, including, but not limited to, 
his education, financial   transactions,   medical   history, and criminal or employment history and that contains  
his  name,  or  the  identifying  number, symbol,  or  other  identifying  particular  assigned  to  the  individual,  
such  as  a   finger  or voice print or a  photograph – Privacy Act 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a), the California Online 
Privacy Protection Act defines ‘personally identifiable information’ as ‘individually identifiable information 
about an individual consumer collected online by the operator from that individual and maintained by the 
operator in an accessible form (…)’ (Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code § 22577) and the California Government Code 
identifies ‘electronically collected personal information’ as ‘any information that is maintained by an agency 
that identifies or describes an individual user (…)’ (Cal. Gov. Code § 11015.5).  
41 Opinion, supra note 40, 13. 
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• Demographic data (age, gender, sexual orientation, political affiliation, 
ethnicity…); and 
 
• Official identifying data (such as names, ID or social security numbers, credit card 
information…). 42 
This definition is broad, purposely so as it has been used to capture many types of 
information under data protection regulation.43 Although it may be a useful definition in that 
context, it lacks specificity for the purpose of this thought experiment, as it includes 
information which is collected without commercial purpose. The focus of this analysis is on 
personal data which can be part of an exchange between a seller, or service provider, and a 
user, and which can be monetized by the seller. This type of information will be called 
‘tradable personal data’ (TPD) throughout this discussion. This definition is similar, but more 
narrow, than the one proposed by Dinev and Hart, who define personal information as ‘the 
type of information necessary to conduct an online transaction’. Their definition includes any 
information necessary to purchase goods or services or to register at websites, 44  i.e. 
information which acts as a means to facilitate some interaction, whereas this paper's 
definition focusses on the benefit one party wants to obtain in an exchange, as the objective 
itself of the transaction.   
The second concept in need of a definition is the notion of ‘price’. This term – ‘price’ 
– is routinely used in a wide range of settings: from conversations between private 
 
42 Org.for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev. [OECD], Exploring the Economics of Personal Data: A Survey of 
Methodologies for Measuring Monetary Value, DSTI/ICCP/IE/REG(2011)2/FINAL, 8 (2013). 
43 Note that the U.S. has a different approach and the definition coming closest to this definition can be found in 
the CPPA (Paul M. Schwartz and Daniel J. Solove, Defining Personal Data, 13 Privacy and Sec. L. Report 1581 
(2014)). 
44 Tamara Dinev and Paul Hart, An Extended Privacy Calculus Model for E-Commerce Transactions, 17 (1) J. 
Information Systems Research 61, 63 (2006). 
  
14 
 
individuals, to policy debates and academic theoretical discourse. In most situations its 
meaning is taken for granted, clear from the context in which the term is used. Generally, it is 
used to describe some form of payment: something that has to be given ‘up’ to receive 
something else.45 Consumers use the word price to mean the ‘cost’ of obtaining what they 
want. They enter in a transaction with another entity that has something they want and give 
something in return. Price, thus, involves a notion of ‘quid pro quo’: giving X (the price) to 
receive Y (the good or service). This is what is called, in common law of contracts, 
‘consideration’: the reciprocity that makes a contract legally binding, when each party to a 
contract is both promisor and promisee of something of value. 46  Consideration does not 
require money per se. Barter, i.e. the exchange of goods or services for other goods or 
services, falls within its ambit. 47 In Gottlieb v. Tropicana a U.S. Court held that, despite the 
lack of monetary price, there had been sufficient consideration for a contract to be established. 
This case specifically concerned the exchange of personal information for a service. The facts 
revolved around the offer of a Diamond Club card at a casino, which entitled the holder to 
spin a wheel of fortune, the Million Dollar Wheel, once a day. To obtain the Diamond Club 
card a customer had to submit personal data, which would be used for targeted marketing. In 
the case, a Diamond Club card holder had spun the wheel and won the grand prize, which the 
casino refused to pay out. The casino claimed before the court that, amongst others, there was 
no valid contract because there was insufficient consideration. The court disagreed, holding 
that “[b]y presenting her Diamond Club card to the casino attendant and allowing it to be 
swiped into the casino's machine, she was permitting the casino to gather information about 
her gambling habits.” 48 The idea implicit in the reasoning of the Court is that other things 
 
45 DONALD RUTHERFORD, ECONOMICS: THE KEY CONCEPTS 159 (Routledge Key Guides 2007). 
46 EMILY FINCH and STEFAN FAFINSKI, LAWEXPRESS: CONTRACT LAW 36 (Pearson 3rd ed. 2013). 
47 DONALD RUTHERFORD, ECONOMICS: THE KEY CONCEPTS 159 (Routledge Key Guides 2007). 
48 Gottlieb v. Tropicana Hotel and Casino, 109 F. Supp. 2d 324 (E.D. Pa. 2000) § 329 (own emphasis). 
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than the promise of money can constitute consideration. This holds true as well for price in 
general. 
The idea of ‘quid pro quo’ or consideration can form the basis for a definition of the 
concept of price. A price is a tool of communication, a way for buyers and sellers to express 
their intentions, to signal that they value what the other has to offer, and to indicate how 
much they are willing to give in exchange. Price is broadly speaking the amount of money or 
something of worth that has to be sacrificed to obtain one unit of a good or service.49 
Although prices are customarily expressed in terms of money, they can be rendered in terms 
of other goods or services. Although not expressed in this way by the Court, this was the case 
in Gottlieb v. Tropicana: the price had been rendered in ‘swipes’ and in personal information 
- the swipe of the Club Card to spin the wheel, personal information to obtain the Club Card. 
Price, in other words, is the amount of a medium of exchange which needs to be paid to 
obtain a good or service. A medium of exchange is the substance or good which, although it 
may have little intrinsic value, is widely used and accepted to pay for goods or services. 
People will readily accept it, even if they do not need it for itself, because they know they can 
use it to purchase other goods or services.50 The good occupies a particular position in the 
economy, acting as a sort of ‘go-between’.51 Without it, trade would be more difficult, as the 
exchange of goods would require a double coincidence of wants.52   
The definition of price, then, can be formulated as follows: price is the amount of 
something of worth that has to be exchanged to obtain one unit of a good or service, i.e. price 
is an agreed amount of a medium of exchange. This means that personal data could be used 
 
49 Rutherford, supra note 45, 159; Irena Asmundson, Back to Basics: What Is a Price?, 50(4) Fin. and Dev. 42 
(2013). 
50 Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and Randall Wright, Acceptability, Means of Payment, and Media of Exchange, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 18  (1992); Robert A. Jones, The Origin and Development of 
Media of Exchange, 84(4) J. Political Economy 757, 758 (1976). 
51 NEWLYN, supra note 53, 1; Ingham, supra note 53, 81. 
52 NEWLYN, supra note 53, 2; JEVONS, supra note 53, 13; HARRIS, supra  note 53, 36. 
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as a price, if it can be a medium of exchange. Although many items could be used as a 
medium of exchange (past media of exchange have included cattle, shells, stones, corn, cacao 
nuts, tobacco, salt, and so on) in practice one article will be selected by custom or by force of 
circumstances. Money is our current medium of exchange – the set of assets in the economy 
regularly used to buy goods – in addition to being our unit of account, store of value and 
standard of deferred payment.53 This is unlikely to change any time soon. However, it can be 
argued that in a particular subset of the economy – the online business models centered on the 
offer of free goods for profit – personal data may come to fulfil that function. Whether an 
item has the potential to be a medium of exchange is interesting for multiple areas of 
academic and policy debate, ranging from the macro-economic views of currencies and 
prices, to the regulation of relationships between people at a micro-level. This paper does not 
mean to get involved in those debates, however fascinating they may be. What is of concern, 
for the purposes of this analysis, is the way in which this definition of price (as an amount of 
a medium of exchange) can assist with market definition. Market definition involves an 
assessment of demand-side substitution. The use of media of exchange (the payment of prices) 
indicates the willingness of individuals to trade, and the value they attribute to goods and 
services relative to each other. Because their access to the medium of exchange fluctuates, 
individuals distribute it according to their own preferences and priorities. They will use less 
of the medium for products of lesser value to them, and more of the medium to products of 
higher value. Thus, the attribution of media of exchange in the economy – the ‘prices paid’ – 
reflects demand. 
 
53 N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 612 (CENGAGE Learning 7th ed. 2015); CHARLES 
A.CONANT, THE PRINCIPLES OF MONEY AND BANKING 20 (Harper and Brothers 1905); Iulia  Andreea Bucur and 
Stefan Sambotin, On Money as an Institution and Medium of Exchange, 16 – 17 Studies an Scientific 
Researches. Economics Edition 37, 38 (2011-2012); WILLIAM STANLEY JEVONS, MONEY AND THE MECHANISM 
OF EXCHANGE 13 (K. Paul, Trench, and Co. 1909); W. T. NEWLYN, THEORY OF MONEY 2 (OUP 1962); JOSEPH 
HARRIS, AN ESSAY UPON MONEY AND COINS. PART I: THE THEORIES OF COMMERCE, MONEY, AND 
EXCHANGES 37 (1757); Geoffrey Ingham, ‘Babylonian Madness’: On the Historical and Sociological Origins of 
Money, in 1 THEORIES OF MONEY AND BANKING: DEVELOPMENT OF HETERODOX APPROACHES TO MONEY AND 
BANKING 82 (The International Library of Critical Writing in Economics 268, Elgar Research Collection 2000). 
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 In general, eight different requirements need to be fulfilled for an item to be an ‘ideal’ 
medium of exchange, although not all historical media of exchange have fulfilled every one. 
These requirements are: value, acceptability, relative durability and stability, portability, 
divisibility, storability, recognizability and homogeneity. 54  Two caveats need to be made 
regarding these requirements. First, it is important to remember that these requirements are 
the criteria for an ‘ideal’ medium of exchange. Money itself does not fulfil all of these 
perfectly at all times. Even items which do not satisfy all of these requirements can be media 
of exchange, as long as they are valued by trade participants and accepted by them in 
exchange for goods and services. The fulfillment of these two requirements – value and 
acceptability – is essential for any item to function as a medium of exchange. Second, the 
threshold for the fulfillment of these requirements may vary depending on the ultimate use of 
the item. If the medium of exchange is to be used as a currency for the wider economy, or as 
an investment vehicle, the item may have to satisfy the criteria to a higher degree, and in the 
eyes of more trade participants, than in the context at hand. In this article, the concept of 
personal data as a medium of exchange is approached for the purpose of being a measure of 
demand-side substitutability. The most important requirements, therefore, are value and 
acceptability, to be fulfilled from the perspective of the consumers of the services for which 
personal data is exchanged. Users of an online service should attribute a certain value to their 
data, and accept that their data is provided in exchange for goods or services. If they do, their 
purchasing actions can reveal their opinion on the extent that products fulfill their needs and 
wants. By ‘spending’ less personal data on one service, but more on another, they signal their 
preferences for certain products. If consumers value personal data, and accept it as a means of 
exchange, their consumption patterns would reveal which products they consider to be 
substitutes. Personal data would be the price they pay, and a way to measure demand-side 
 
54 Conant, supra note 53; Jevons, supra note 53 ; Newlyn, supra note 53 ; Harris, supra note 53 ; Jones, supra 
note 50 ; Kiyotaki and Wright, supra note 50. 
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substitutability. Value and acceptability will be discussed in more detail in the following 
sections. 
B. Value 
1. Value in Theory 
In order for an item to be a medium of exchange, it needs to have a recognized value. 
Without the existence of this value in the minds of those exchanging in trade, the item will 
not readily be accepted as a medium of exchange. The medium can derive its value from 
different sources: the value can be intrinsic, meaning that it corresponds to the independent 
value of the good it is composed of; the value may be external, because it is a consequence of 
the item’s relationship to other goods; or it can purely be a result of social convention.55 TPD 
can only be used as a medium of exchange if it has value, whether it is intrinsic, external, a 
result of social convention, or a combination of all of these. It may be worth examining 
whether there are any reasons TPD could have value in the minds of the persons engaging in 
commerce online. 
The intrinsic value of a medium of exchange is often a result of the scarcity or the 
utility of its composing object. In some cases, it can also be the result of the cost of parting 
with it. In the first case, the medium of exchange is valuable because the item itself is finite 
and highly desired.56 The composing good is in limited supply, and in high demand. It should 
not be too scarce, however, as it has to exist in sufficient quantity to meet the needs of 
trade.57 Scarcity does not need to be universal: it may be that an object is scarce in one place, 
but not in another. The high cost or difficulty involved in transporting the object from one 
place, where the object can be found in abundance, to another, where it cannot or can hardly 
 
55 JEVONS, supra note 53, 9 and 11; CONANT, supra note 53, 71. 
56 HARRIS, supra  note 53, 41 and 45. 
57 HARRIS, supra  note 53, 78; JEVONS, supra note 53, 49. 
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be found, can make it scarce in the last place and give it value. The value can also be a 
consequence of the cost involved in the collection, production or reproduction of the 
medium.58 Extensive labor input can give the medium value. A modern example of a medium 
which acquires value because of the labor required is the digital currency Bitcoin, which 
needs to be ‘mined’59 by individuals.60 An earlier example is the sea shells which were used 
as media of exchange in the East Indies and by Native American Tribes, 61 and had to be 
collected, sorted, polished and assembled on string. The second cause of intrinsic value lies in 
the utility of the composing object. The extent a commodity gratifies a need or desire 
determines its value to members of society.62 An object’s use may be ornamental, which was 
the case for shell beads which were used for ornamental purposes by Native American tribes 
and later adopted as media of exchange. Commodities with a particular use, such as input or 
consumption goods, have also been used as media of exchange in the past, deriving their 
value from their use purely as a commodity and their utility as a medium of exchange.63 The 
last cause of intrinsic value is the cost of parting with a medium. This cost may be tangible or 
intangible. 
It is possible to argue that TPD has intrinsic value. This intrinsic value is unlikely to 
lie in the scarcity of TPD. Personal data may be in high demand, but in principle the supply 
of personal data is not limited, in so far as the technical means and regulatory framework 
enable its collection. The amount of times an individual can give the same personal 
information is generally not limited, as personal data is a non-rivalrous good. Although effort 
is required in the development of technology for its collection and storage, the reproduction 
 
58 HARRIS, supra  note 53, 42. 
59 ‘Mining’ refers to the process of running mathematical hash verification processes to generate bitcoins and to 
validate Bitcoin transactions, thus ensuring the security of the Bitcoin ledge. 
60 Nikolei Kaplanov, Nerdy Money : Bitcoin, the Private Digital Currency, and the Case against its Regulation, 
25(1) Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 111, 119-121 (2012). 
61 JEVONS, supra note 53, 24. 
62 JEVONS, supra note 53, 9. 
63 JEVONS, supra note 53, 42. 
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of personal data is no exorbitant cost. The utility of data may be a partial source of its value. 
It is used as an input for consumer services, targeted advertising, analytical services and other 
applications being developed in the digital economy. Although scarcity and utility can 
provide theoretical explanations for the intrinsic value of data from the point of view of the 
businesses who collect it, personal data needs to be valued by users as well. Only then can it 
be a medium of exchange, and a measure of demand-side substitutability. The cost of parting 
with personal data could explain the value of personal data to users, as sharing personal data 
entails privacy and opportunity costs. Sharing personal information involves some loss of 
privacy, and the knowledge that companies may possess information about you which they 
will put to use. Additionally, although an individual could give the same information to 
multiple entities, in some cases data may be the most valuable the first time it is shared. 
Therefore, sharing it comes with the opportunity cost of not being able to reveal it for the first 
time to another company.  
Regardless of its intrinsic value, a medium of exchange’s value may be external, or a 
result of social convention. The relationship to other goods, such as gold, may attribute 
external value to a coin or piece of paper, which it does not intrinsically possess. The external 
goods guarantee the value of the medium, often strengthened by social convention. Habit, 
custom or legal enactment may attribute value to a medium of exchange, without reference to 
the properties of the medium or to another good. The intrinsic value of a good may still 
matter, but is not necessary: an object can derive its value solely from the social agreement.64 
The force of the social convention as an assignor of value coincides with the quality of 
acceptability described below. The acceptance and use of an object as something with value 
by members of the society enforces the notion that it has a purpose and thus value. 
 
64 Xavier Cuadras-Morato, Can Ice Cream Be Money ?: Perishable Medium of Exchange, 66(2) J. Econ. 103, 
105 (1997). 
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2. Value in Practice 
Asserting the causes of a medium’s value is an interesting theoretical exercise. The real 
valuation of data, however, requires a more practical approach. Several methods can be used 
to determine the value of personal data. Unsurprisingly, each of these methods has its 
drawbacks. Studies on the value of data are fairly recent, and the research on the topic is still 
in its infancy. The economic use of personal data is a growing business with a lot more room 
for research. As the business grows, the literature on the topic is supplemented with 
additional research. Based on this research, there are three ways to approach the valuation 
question: studies can assess the value from the point of view of businesses, from the point of 
view of the users or ‘data subjects’, or from the point of view of an exchange between 
businesses and users. Two categories of valuation methods will be discussed: first, business-
to-business (B2B) market based assessments and second, valuations that incorporate the data 
subject. All methods have their pros and cons and still require refinement. Their existence, 
however, shows that it is indeed possible to attribute a value to personal data. The ideal 
valuation would consist of a combination of these different rudimentary methods. 
The first category of valuation methods consists of business-based assessments, which 
determine the value of personal data solely on information from corporate activities which do 
not directly involve the data subject, the consumer. The use of personal data by companies is 
thriving and growing. This is illustrated by the development of the field of infonomics, which 
is the study of the economic significance of information. The term was coined by Douglas 
Laney, and this field of research recognizes the potential of information as a business asset 
and studied how to quantify information’s value. 65  As the corporate use of personal data 
 
65 Douglas Laney, Introducing Infonomics: Valuing Information as a Corporate Asset, Gartner Research 
G002277057 (2012), available at https://www.gartner.com/doc/1958016?refval=andpcp=mpe; Daniel Moody 
and Peter Walsh, Measuring the Value of Information: An Asset Valuation Approach, Presented at the European 
Conference on Information Systems 2 (1999), available at http://si.deis.unical.it/zumpano/2004-
2005/PSI/lezione2/ValueOfInformation.pdf. 
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grows, so does the interest in the value of data. Broadly, three groups of valuation methods 
will be discussed: valuations on the basis of company performance, valuations based on the 
cost of data loss or data replacement, and the market price of personal data. The first two 
groups of methods are based on indications of individual companies, whereas the valuation of 
personal data based on its market price refers to business-to-business relations.  
The valuations based on company performance can look at either key performance 
indicators, or at the economic value of a personal data asset. The first option entails running 
experiments to compare how a company performs on one or more performance indicators 
including the use of personal data, with how the company performs on those indicators 
without the use of data.66 The second option evaluates the contribution of data assets to the 
revenue of an organization. The aggregated market capitalization (total market value of the 
shares), revenue or net income of the company is divided by the number of personal data 
records held, to determine the value of each record.67  Revenue can come from multiple 
sources, such as the use of data for targeted advertising68 or the sale of analytical services. 
This method, however, relies on the concept that every record is comparable. In addition, it is 
a reliable method only if most of the company’s revenue is generated through the use of 
personal data or if the data-driven part of the company’s activities is split into a clearly 
separate and distinct part of the company. This method requires information on the company, 
which may not always be public knowledge. Most of the available information used to this 
date comes from U.S. companies. The OECD, for example, analyzed the U.S. figures of data 
 
66 Nicole Laskowski, Six Ways to Measure the Value of your Information Assets, in CIO DECISIONS: THE NEW 
INFONOMICS REALITY: DETERMINING THE VALUE OF DATA (SearchCIO TechTarget 2014), available at 
http://searchcio.techtarget.com/feature/Six-ways-to-measure-the-value-of-your-information-assets (based on 
Douglas Laney, Why and How to Measure the Value of your Information Assets, Gartner Research G00277972 
(2015), available at https://www.gartner.com/doc/3106719/measure-value-information-assets; Bilyana Petkova 
and Philipp Hacker, Reining in the Big Promise of Big Data: Transparency, Inequality, and New Regulatory 
Frontiers,  13 Lecture and Other Affiliate Scholarship Series 19. 
67 OECD, supra note 42, 20; Laskowski, supra note 66 (based on Laney, supra note 66); Petkova and Hacker, 
supra note 66, 20. 
68 Method used by Petkova and Hacker, supra note 66. 
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broker Experian and of social network site Facebook in its 2011 report. The concept of 
valuations based on the cost of data if it needs to be replaced is best illustrated by the loss of 
data in case of a security breach. Such a loss will imply multiple costs, such as the risk of 
damages claimed by customers, but also the cost of replacing the data.69 This cost value of 
information has been set out by Laney, based on the accounting principles of replacement 
costs, used for most intangible assets that do not have a discernible market value. 70 The last 
approach to business-based valuations tries to determine the market value of personal data, by 
assessing the revenue generated from the sale, license or barter of personal data. It determines 
the price in competitive markets, which is in principle the market clearing price at the 
intersection of supply and demand. As personal data is non-rivalrous (use does not diminish 
the supply), the market clearing price may not fully coincide with the full economic value of 
the underlying personal data record. In addition, the market clearing price may also include 
other elements such as the costs incurred by the company in the collection and management 
of the data.71  However, for the purposes of market definition, it seems that the market 
clearing price is a sensible determinant of personal data’s value. A bigger problem with the 
reliance on market prices is that the information available on market prices refers to B2B 
relations, such as sales by data brokers or by companies such as Facebook or Twitter to third 
parties. For a more comprehensive understanding of the value of personal data, it is necessary 
to introduce the consumer side into the equation. 
Valuations that incorporate the data subject are vital to the use of personal data as a 
price for the definition of the market with regard to ‘free’ services on the Internet. These 
services are part of B2C (business-to-consumer) relationships in which personal data is the 
price paid by consumers, the data subjects. Only taking into account the value of personal 
 
69 OECD, supra note 42, 20 - 29. 
70 Laskowski, supra note 66 (based on Laney, supra note 66); OECD, supra note 42, 25. 
71 OECD, supra note 42, 25. 
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data for a company’s activities, or the value within the B2B relationships, would not be 
appropriate. Information on the value that data subjects attribute to their personal data is less 
readily available than information on the value attributed by businesses. This does not mean, 
however, that no methods exist to approximate such an evaluation. Over time the interest in 
the valuation of personal data by individuals has grown and the literature on the subject has 
expanded. Surveys and experiments have been done on the individual valuation of specific 
personal data records by consumers, as well as on their willingness to pay for privacy and 
willingness to accept money for personal data. This research reveals that a value can be 
assigned to personal data by individuals, which often varies depending on the types of 
personal data.72 It also revealed that the amount of consumers willing to accept money in 
exchange for their personal data is generally greater than the number of consumers willing to 
pay the same price for the protection against disclosure of this information. 73  These 
differences between willingness to pay for privacy (WTP) and willingness to accept money 
for personal data (WTA) illustrate that WTP alone may not be the most accurate method for 
determining the valuation of personal data by individual consumers. Moreover, surveys and 
experiments have clear downsides. Surveys reveal stated preferences, which, as illustrated by 
the privacy paradox, may not coincide with reality. Experiments have the drawback that the 
context and framing of the experiment can have a decisive impact on participants’ decisions, 
thus skewing the results. These disadvantages should not be construed as a reason not to 
continue further research into the valuation of personal data by consumers, especially if 
experiments can be set up in such a way as to more closely resemble real-life scenarios of the 
exchange of personal data for monetary benefits. Consumers routinely encounter situations in 
which they exchange personal data for a benefit, such as for a free service or discounted good. 
 
72 Huberman, Adar and Fine, supra note 132, 22; Acquisti and Grossklags, supra note 114, 28. 
73 OECD, supra note 42, 30; Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie K. John and George Loewenstein, What is Privacy 
Worth?, 42(2) J. Legal Stud. 249 (2013); Grossklags and Acquisti supra note 131; Christine Bauer, Jana 
Korunovska and Sarah Spiekermann, On the Value of Information – What Facebook Users are Willing to Pay, 
Proceedings of the European Conference on Information Systems Paper 197, 3 (2012). 
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These scenarios can be used as points of reference for the valuation of personal data by 
consumers. Nonetheless, results from such experiments would not suffice on its own, as it 
may not reveal the actual value consumers can obtain for their personal data in relation to a 
company.74 Another, potentially more appropriate, method of assigning user-based value to 
personal data is to perform a market analysis which includes the data subject. A market 
approach captures an economic value resulting from the intersection of supply and demand.75 
As of yet, the direct sale, license or barter of personal data is mostly done in B2B relations, 
but markets where individuals trade their own data are developing, as described below.76 
Companies like Datacoup or People.io offer consumers the possibility to exchange their 
personal data for monetary benefits, such as money, offers by third parties, or credits. The 
offer of credits in exchange for the personal data may not sound wholly new: even before the 
advent of digital markets, consumers received credits (or ‘points’) when using certain loyalty 
or ‘frequent shopper’ cards which record data about their shopping behavior.77 The modern 
schemes take this a step further, by making the exchange of personal data for credits more 
explicit, and clearly articulating how many credits one obtains in exchange for the personal 
data. A study of these businesses could provide valuable insights into the value of personal 
data. When trying to ascertain the value of TPD, it could be instructive to establish the 
amount of credits individuals get in these schemes for their personal data and what it is they 
can buy with their credits. Let’s assume that information on the phone brand a consumer uses 
is worth 10 credits.78 If, say, 100 credits equals a $5 discount in an online store, then one 
personal data record, here the information on the consumer’s phone brand, is worth $0.50. To 
 
74 OECD, supra note 42, 32. 
75 OECD, supra note 42, 32. 
76 See C.3. Acceptability: Data Markets and Other Shifts to TPD 
77 Timothy R. Graeff and Susan Harmon, Collecting an using personal data: consumers’ awareness and 
concerns, 19(4) Journal of Consumer Marketing 302, 304 (2002); Nils Zurawski, Local Practice and Global 
Data: Loyalty Cards, Social Practices, and Consumer Surveilance, 52(4) The Sociological Quarterly 509, 510 
(2011); Acquisti and Grossklags, supra note 114, 29. 
78 Which it seems to be on the People.io website – People.io offers 10 credits for an answer to certain questions 
when you first start using the website. People.io are not yet active in Yorkshire, but they are in London, however. 
It is not clear what the exchange rate of credits is. 
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be able to posit, with some degree of certainty, that such a valuation is representative of the 
B2C market in data trade would require information from multiple data locker services, 
which at present is lacking. These nascent services could improve the process of valuation of 
personal data, as they incorporate both the demand side and the supply side in the B2C 
relationship. It will be interesting to see how they develop and whether more such business 
models emerge.79 
 
 
 Each of the methods described above suffers from the novelty of personal data as an 
asset and as a medium of exchange. It is important to acknowledge that, without more 
research and practical evidence on the value of data, the use of TPD as price for the purposes 
of market definition would not be feasible. This article continues on the assumption that it is 
possible to value TPD, and that future studies and business practice will contribute to 
enabling B2C and B2B valuations. From the perspective of companies, the research on 
valuations of data by companies as part of their intangible assets is scarce, but growing, as 
 
79 OECD, supra note 42, 34. 
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more and more companies collect and sell data. As this industry expands, so does the demand 
for proper valuation methods which overcome some of the current problems with the 
transposition of current accounting methods.80 From the perspective of consumers, there is 
yet more work to be done, as the development of B2C data trade is younger and less 
developed. Thus, there remain many opportunities for research into the business-to-consumer 
valuation of personal data, in particular with regard to a potential market price for personal 
data. However, as more companies venture into the sale, license or barter of personal data 
from consumer to business, practical evidence and expertise increases, allowing for a better 
idea of the B2C value of personal data. This is essential to establish personal data as a 
medium of exchange in the future.   
C. Acceptability 
A key requirement for an object to be a medium of exchange is that it is accepted as such by 
the members of the economy in which it is used. This means that its position as a ‘go-
between’ is acknowledged or capable of being accepted by a majority of the individuals in 
that community. Acceptability may be the result of social convention, the force of 
circumstances or custom, or it may be imposed from higher up. An item might be accepted as 
a medium of exchange only in part of a society – a ‘sub’ community or economy – as is the 
case with Bitcoin, as long as members of that economy or community are aware, and 
accepting, of its use. In order for TPD to be a medium of exchange in a (subset of) the digital 
economy, it is necessary for it to be widely accepted as such in the relationship between 
businesses and consumers. The difficulty lies not with the businesses, who routinely engage 
in a trade of data,81 but with consumers. Acceptability requires that consumers are aware of 
 
80 Juergen Sidgman and Malcolm Crompton, Valuing Personal Data to Foster Privacy: A Thought Experiment 
and Opportunities for Research, 30(2) Journal of Information Systems 169 (2016); Adam B. Thimmesch, 
Transacting in Data: Tax, Privacy, and the New Economy, 94(1) Denver Law Review 145, 173 (2016). 
81 UK Competition and Markets Authority [CMA], The Commercial Use of Consumer Data: Report on the 
CMA’s Call for Information, 34 (2015), available at 
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its use and are willing to treat it as medium in a trade relationship. Two elements of 
consumers’ current and future attitude to TPD will be discussed briefly: their awareness of 
data collection and use, and their willingness to exchange personal data for benefits. 
1. Awareness 
It is paramount that a certain degree of awareness exists for the argument that TPD may be 
(or may become) a medium of exchange, and a measure of demand-side substitutability. 
Consumers need to be aware of three things: 1) of the phenomenon of data collection itself 
and the circumstances in which it takes place, 2) of the types of information collected and 
their use, and 3) of the fact that the collection happens in exchange for benefits.  
First, consumer awareness of data collection is an important element within the 
relationship between a data subject and a commercial entity. It seems that consumers are 
increasingly conscious of the regular collection of data by companies. 82 Around 80% of the 
survey respondents in Deloitte’s 2013 report reported awareness of the existence of data 
collection, and the subsequent report in 2014 stated that these numbers were increasing.83 
Respondents to the UK Competition and Markets Authority’s (CMA) call for information 
proposed that awareness was high due to companies’ frequent privacy notices, terms and 
conditions, and cookie bars (informing consumers of cookies on the website).84 This might 
indicate that mandatory information obligations do indeed serve a purpose: that of making 
consumers conscious of the phenomenon of data collection. Nonetheless, although consumers 
 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/435817/The_commercial_use_of
_consumer_data.pdf. 
82 Consumer Focus survey cited in CMA, supra note 81, 98, footnote 111 (98% of consumers think that some 
personal data and information is collected by ‘free’ services); JAMIE BARTLETT, THE DATA DIALOGUE 14 and 
34(Demos Report 2012), available at http://www.demos.co.uk/files/The_Data_Dialogue.pdf?1347544233 
(‘hereinafter Demos Report’) (85% aware that online purchasing history data collected and used). 
83 HARVEY LEWIS, CECILIA LIAO and NEHA PANDEY, DATA NATION 2013: BALANCING GROWTH AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 1 (Deloitte Insight 2013), available at http://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/deloitte-
analytics/articles/data-nation-2013-balancing-growth-and-responsibility.html (hereinafter ‘Deloitte 2013’); 
HARVEY LEWIS and CECILIA LIAO, DATA NATION 2014: PUTTING CUSTOMERS FIRST 3 (Deloitte Insight 2014), 
available at http://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/deloitte-analytics/articles/data-nation-2014-putting-
customers-first.html (hereinafter ‘Deloitte 2014’). 
84 CMA, supra note 81, 99. 
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know that data collection is a reality, they are less aware of how and when data is being 
collected. Information duties may increase awareness of the phenomenon itself, but they 
manage to increase awareness of the methods and circumstances only to a limited extent. 
Privacy policies are often vague, and them is time-consuming. 85 According to Deloitte’s 2013 
report, it would take an individual 31 hours to read the privacy policies of all new websites 
they visit in a year.86 Agreements on the collection personal data are often incomplete or 
(intentionally) opaque, lacking details on the use of the data (including transfers to third 
parties). 87 Although consumers are conscious of the collection of data in general, the specific 
means of collection, usage and storage are far less engrained. Of the 80% of consumers who 
were aware of data collection in general, only 35% claimed to understand it ‘fully’, whereas 
45% said they did not know the details.88 There is a notable difference between awareness of 
active data collection and awareness of passive collection. Active collection implies the direct 
solicitation of information from the consumer, which happens for example when a consumer 
fills in a form or survey. Consumers are aware of active data collection.89 Passive collection, 
such as cookies tracking the websites visited or purchasing habits, is less obvious. The degree 
 
85 Carlos Jensen and Colin Potts, Privacy Policies as Decision-Making Tools: An Evaluation of Online Privacy 
Notices, 6(1) Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, ACM Press 
471 (2004); Aleecia M. McDonald and Lorrie Faith Cranor, Beliefs and Behaviors: Internet Users’ 
Understanding of Behavioral Understanding, Presentation at the TPRC2010 Conference 41 (2010) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1989092; Alessandro Acquisti, Curtis R. Taylor and Liad Wagman, The Economics of 
Privacy, 54 (2) Journal of Economic Literature 442, 479 (2016). 
86 Deloitte 2013, supra note 83, 6; David B. Meinert, Dane K. Peterson, John R. Criswell and Martin D. 
Crossland, Privacy Policy Statements and Consumer Willingness to Provide Personal Information, 4(1) J. 
Electronic Commerce in Organizations 5 and 13 (2006): while respondents were generally aware of privacy 
policy statements, most do not take the time to read them. 
87 Alastair R. Beresford, Dorothea Kübler and Sören Preibusch, Unwillingness to Pay for Privacy: A Field 
Experiment, 117 Economics Letters 25 (2012); Tony Vila, Rachel Greenstadt and David Molnar, Why We Can’t 
Be Bothered to Read Privacy Policies: Models of Privacy Economics as a Lemons Market, Proceedings of the 
5th  International Conference on Electronic Commerce 403, 404 (2003). 
88 Deloitte 2013, supra note 83, 1. 
89 DANIEL CAMERON, SARAH POPE, MICHAEL CLEMENCE and IPSOS MORI SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 
DIALOGUE ON DATA: EXPLORING THE PUBLIC’S VIEW ON USING ADMINISTRATIVE DATA FOR RESEARCH 
PURPOSES 20 (Economic and Social Research Council and Office for National Statistics Report 2014); IPSOS 
MORI SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, BEING ONLINE: AN INVESTIGATION OF PEOPLE’S HABITS AND ATTITUDES 
35 (Ofcom Report 2013). 
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of consumer knowledge varies depending on the method concerned.90 For example, only a 
small number of consumers (21%) surveyed by Hoofnagle et al were unaware of the 
existence of cookies,91 but as companies frequently develop new techniques to collect data, 
consumers have a hard time keeping up. 92  In their 2010 paper, McDonald and Cranor 
summarized this problem in one sentence: ‘[our] lab study quickly disabused us of any idea 
of studying user perceptions’ of some of these techniques.93 
Second, awareness of the types of information being collected, and of the actual use 
of this information, requires examination. Consumers expect that services will collect a wide 
range of data.94 It would seem sensible, then, to assume that consumers would read privacy 
policies and thus would know which type of information they divulge. However, many of 
these policies describe broad categories of information (such as ‘personal information’) or 
give a list of data without describing exactly when they are being collected.95 Even if they 
were more specific, many consumers do not even read the privacy policies of the companies 
they interact with. Thus, the awareness of the types of data collected remains limited. When it 
comes to actual usage of data, consumer knowledge varies. Advertising and marketing 
purposes are the most commonly cited examples of data use. According to a 2014 survey by 
the Royal Statistical Society (RSS) 77% of respondents are aware that targeted advertisement 
 
90 McDonald and Cranor, supra note 85, 9; Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Ashkan Soltani, Nathaniel Good, Dietrich J. 
Wambach and Mika D. Ayenson, Behavioral Advertising: The Offer You Cannot Refuse, 6 Harv. L. and Pol'y 
Rev. 273, 276 (2012). 
91 Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Jennifer King, Su Li and Joseph Turow, How Different Are Young Adults from Older 
Adults When It Comes to Information Privacy Attitudes and Policies? 13 (2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1589864. 
92 Hoofnagle, Soltani, Good, Wambach, and Ayenson, supra note 90, 277 - 283; Acquisti, Taylor and Wagman, 
supra note 85, 464. 
93 McDonald and Cranor, supra note 85, 7. 
94 Consumer Focus Survey of 2012, cited in CMA supra note 81, 99, revealed that 70% of users of ‘free services’ 
expected these services to collect search history, sites visited, ‘likes’, location and purchases. 
95 E.g. privacy policies of: Google (www.google.com/policies/privacy/), Amazon 
(https://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=gss?nodeId=502584), Facebook 
(https://www.facebook.com/policy.php#). 
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is based on previous browsing data.96 Although advertising and marketing are current the 
most important example of data usage for purposes other than the improvement of the service, 
companies could also sell, share, or license data for other purposes, which are not widely 
understood and not always specifically communicated to the data subjects. Awareness of the 
types of information collected, as well as the uses, could increase as companies policies come 
under scrutiny through media coverage or regulatory intervention. Currently, ‘transparency’ 
and data protection is very in vogue. 97  If discussion and intervention continues, it seems 
likely that consumer knowledge of data collection will increase. 
Lastly, it is important to know whether consumers realize that the services they use 
are not ‘free’ but part of an exchange of benefits. The CMA call for information98 revealed 
that respondents are increasingly thinking of being part of a ‘mutual value exchange’. 99 Some 
of the benefits that were cited by the consumers and businesses responding to the call were: 
personalized offers and discounts, product improvement, and free access to services which 
would likely charge money for use if they could not generate revenue through the trade of 
data.100 There is evidence that the public is generally not willing to pay for free services (in 
money). 101 Although a ‘trust deficit’, as described by the RSS,102 may make consumers wary 
 
96 IPSOS MORI SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO THE USE AND SHARING OF THEIR DATA 21 
(Royal Statistical Society Report 2014), available at http://www.statslife.org.uk/news/1672-new-rss-research-
finds-data-trust-deficit-with-lessons-for-policymakers. 
97 Emma Cradock, Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon and Davd Millard, Nobdy Puts Data in a Corner? Why a New 
Approach to Categorising Personal Data is Required for the Obligation to Inform, 33 (2) Computer Law & 
Security Review (2017); 
98 Carried out in January 2015 throughout UK amongst consumers, consumer representatives, individual firms 
and their representatives, trade bodies, research/academic organizations and others, including infomediaries. 
(see p.5 of call for information). The Call for Information was supplemented with information from factual 
reviews commissioned from DotEcon and Analysys Mason. This information was combined into a final report 
to be found at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/435817/The_commercial_use_of
_consumer_data.pdf. 
99 CMA, supra note 81, 102; Demos Report, supra note 82, 14. 
100 CMA, supra note 8181, 51, 54, and 59. 
101 Survey, Consumer Focus, supra note 82. 
102 IPSOS MORI, supra note 95, 9; see THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, THE BUSINESS OF DATA 15 
(Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Report 2015): “it’s a  question of trust”. 
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of data sharing,103 it seems they are increasingly conscious of the use of data for purposes 
which may be beneficial to them. However, this knowledge is the result of media coverage 
rather than of an actual exchange of information between companies and consumers. If the 
provision of personal information is to be an actual trade, consumers should know in more 
detail, at the time of exchange, which benefits they may expect in return for their TPD. 
Transparency on the collection and use of information is vital to create an environment of 
mutual benefit and exchange. As articulated in the Demos report: ‘At the moment people are 
entering into an exchange but are not always sure what they are trading. It is vital to make the 
currency of the exchange more explicit to all parties, so that trust is established.’104 Some 
CMA respondents suggested that awareness would rise with ongoing growth in more explicit 
data-driven services. 105 This may indeed contribute to an environment in which the exchange 
of personal information is seen as an explicit trade. Indeed, organizations are emerging which 
focus on the benefits individuals can get from the trade of their personal data. These are 
discussed below.  
2. Willingness 
The second question is whether consumers would be willing to exchange TPD for economic 
benefits. That businesses derive value from data and engage in data trades is well-known, but 
how do consumers approach the personal data trade? The disclosure of TPD is likely to 
generate trade-offs with tangible economic dimensions. 106 Individuals will disclose TPD only 
if they perceive that the overall benefits of disclosure are at least balanced by, if not greater 
 
103 Consumers seem to consider that the benefit they receive in exchange for their data is by far exceeded by the 
benefit companies derive from the use of their data (CMA, supra note 8181, 103). 
104 Demos Report, supra note 82, 18. 
105 CMA, supra note 81, 100; Demos Report, supra note 82, 40; DIRECT MARKETING ASSOCIATION, DATA 
PRIVACY: WHAT THE CONSUMER REALLY THINKS 10-12 (2012), available at 
http://dma.org.uk/uploads/Data%20privacy%20-
%20What%20the%20consumer%20really%20thinks%202012_53cfd432518f2.pdf. 
106 Acquisti, Taylor and Wagman, supra note 85, 444. 
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than, the assessed risk of disclosure. 107  These efficient bargaining arguments depend on 
consumers internalizing the costs and benefits of trading their personal information. 108 This 
implies a calculation of the costs and benefits involved in the disclosure of TPD. One can ask, 
however, whether such a calculation is indeed possible. 
A calculus of expected returns may be impeded by the lack of (perfect) information 
on the use of the personal data. In addition, even if a consumer were aware of every possible 
usage of that information, bounded rationality and optimism bias mean individuals may 
hyperbolically discount future costs and benefits. Individuals appear to be more inclined to 
reveal information if the immediate gratification from this revelation seems or is superior to 
the delayed (and thus discounted) future consequences (this is called ‘time-inconsistent 
discounting’).109 Thus, consumers may be more willing to provide personal data (such as 
location, gender, IP address and brand preference) in order to receive an application at no 
monetary cost in that very instant, even if they know this information may be sold to and used 
by third parties in intrusive manners at a later time. 
The costs and benefits are both tangible and intangible.110 One particular cost is the 
harm to privacy, whose measurement raises specific questions. First, privacy means different 
things to different people, as well as to different societies.111 Whether privacy is considered 
an inviolable human right or an economic good has an impact on the assessment of its ‘loss’. 
Second, the boundaries of privacy harm can be both subjective (the perception of unwanted 
observation 112 ) and objective (the unanticipated or coerced detrimental use of personal 
 
107 Dinev and Hart, supra note 44, 62. 
108 Acquisti, Taylor and Wagman, supra note 85, 453. 
109 Acquisti, Brandimarte and Loewenstein, supra note 119, 510; Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy in Electronic 
Commerce and the Economics of Immediate Gratification, Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on 
Electronic Commerce  21 (2004). 
110 Acquisti, Taylor and Wagman, supra note 85, 447. 
111 See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154(3) U. Pa. L. Rev. 477, 479 (2006); Acquisti, Taylor and 
Wagman, supra note 85, 44.3 
112 Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86(1) Ind. L.J. 1 (2011). 
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information 113 ). It is difficult to generally quantify subjective privacy harm. Objective 
privacy harm, though easier to quantify, goes beyond the loss which results from a monetary 
payment. When a transaction involves a payment in money, that money cannot be ‘used’ 
against the individual at a later date. This is not the case for TPD. TPD is, by definition, 
related to a person. Its disclosure comes with risks of identity theft, fraud, the divulgence of 
this information to third parties. Calculating this cost requires prior knowledge of the uses the 
data could be put to. There is a problem of information asymmetry. Consumers are rarely, if 
ever, completely aware about the purposes for which their data is being collected and the 
extent of third-party use. 114  Third, the value of privacy to an individual varies on the 
circumstances in which that value is considered. An individual may value privacy more if 
specifically asked about privacy protection, than when given the option to reduce it in 
exchange for benefits.115 
The majority of scholars agree that consumers’ concern for privacy is not absolute. 
Individuals are willing to exchange their personal data for economic benefits.  Most 
individuals are privacy pragmatists, according to a Harris Interactive poll: while concerned 
about privacy, they will trade it for other benefits. 116  Most research on consumers’ 
willingness to disclose information is survey-based, with a lesser amount of in-depth 
analytical research of consumers’ actual behavior. 117  The lack of empirical evidence 
presented on the willingness to trade information for benefits is, according to Norberg, Horne 
and Horne, due to a couple of challenges. First, privacy perceptions vary according to origin 
 
113 Calo, supra note 112, 1. 
114 Alessandro Acquisti and Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision Making, 3(1) IEEE 
Security and Privacy 26, 32 (2012); Dinev and Hart, supra note 44, 64. 
115 Acquisti and Grossklags, supra note 114, 26. 
116 Survey, Most People Are Privacy Pragmatists Who, While Concerned About Privacy, Will Sometimes Trade 
It Off for Other Benefits (Harris Interactive Poll 2003), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/most-people-are-privacy-pragmatists-who-while-concerned-about-privacy-will-sometimes-trade-it-off-
for-other-benefits-says-harris-interactive-survey-74721077.html and 
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=365 (1010 respondents). 
117 Catherine E. Tucker, The Economics of Advertising and Privacy, 30 Journal of Industrial Organization 326, 
327 (2012). 
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and age of the population as well as the type of information involved. Second, the diversity in 
measurements used by researchers has resulted in some confusion regarding the implications 
that can be drawn: some aim to measure privacy concerns, whereas others look at privacy-
related behavioral intentions; empirical research into actual disclosure behavior remains far 
more limited. 118  Considerable academic attention has been devoted to the phenomenon 
commonly called the ‘privacy paradox’: the dichotomy between the expressed concern over 
privacy and actual disclosure behavior. 119 Whereas individuals express significant concern 
about privacy in surveys, their actual disclosure behavior does not reflect this, as revealed in 
several studies120  
Surveys have indicated that consumers are willing to trade personal information for 
benefits. These surveys have been done by both commercial and non-commercial entities.121 
A PwC study revealed that an average of 73% of respondents would consider sharing 
 
118 Patricia A. Norberg, Daniel R. Horne and David A. Horne, The Privacy Paradox: Personal Information 
Disclosure Intention versus Behaviors, 41(1) J. Consumer Affairs 100, 101 (2007). 
119 Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte and George Loewenstein, Privacy and Human Behavior in the Age 
of Information, 347 (6221) Science 509, 510 (2015); Janice Y. Tsai, Serge Egelman, Lorrie Cranor and 
Alessandro Acquisti, The Effect of Online Privacy Information on Purchasing Behavior: An experimental Study, 
22(2) Information Systems Research 254, 255 (2011); Sarah Spiekermann, Jens Grossklags and Bettina Berendt, 
E-Privacy in 2nd Generation Commerce: Privacy Preferences versus Actual Behavior, 48(3) CACM 38 (2005); 
Acquisti and Grossklags, supra note 114, 37; Dinev and Hart, supra note 44, 61. 
120 Tsai, Egelman, Cranor and Acquisti, supra note 119, 259: survey and shopping experiment; Spiekermann, 
Grossklags and Berendt, supra note 119: survey and shopping experiment; Acquisti and Grossklags, supra note 
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Il-Horn Hann, Kai-Lung Hui, Tom S. Lee and I.P.L. Png, Online Information Privacy: Measuring the Cost-
Benefit Trade-Off, Proceedings at the Twenty-Third International Conference on Information Systems (2002): 
survey; Andreas Krause and Eric Horvitz, A Utility-Theoretic Approach to Privacy and Personalization, 39 J. 
Artificial Intelligence Research 633 (2010): survey; Joseph Turow, Michael Hennessy and Nora Draper, The 
Tradeoff Fallacy: How Marketers Are Misrepresenting American Consumers and Opening Them Up to 
Exploitation, A Report from the Annenberg School for Communication University of Pennsylvania (2015), 
available at https://www.asc.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/TradeoffFallacy_1.pdf: survey; Sabine Trepte and 
Leonard Reinecke, The Reciprocal Effects of Social Network Site Use and the Disposition for Self-Disclosure: A 
Longitudinal Study, 29 Computers in Human Behavior 1102 (2012): survey; Joseph Phelps, Glen Nowak and 
Elizabeth Ferrell, Privacy Concerns and Consumer Willingness to Provide Personal Information, J. Public 
Policy and Marketing 27 (2000): survey. 
121 http://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/newsroom/newsn/3850/study-shows-that-consumers-are-willing-to-share-
personal-data-if-the-benefits-and-brand-are-right; http://www.dma.org.uk/uploads/ckeditor/Data-privacy-2015-
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information depending on the benefits they would receive in exchange. This seemed to hold 
even more with younger consumers (18-29).122 According to Deloitte’s 2014 Report nearly 
two-thirds of consumers would be willing to exchange their personal information for benefits, 
ranging from money savings to improved or personalized services. 123  As early as 2000, 
Phelps, Nowak and Ferrell concluded that catalogue shoppers’ purchase intentions are greater 
when shopping benefits or time savings are offered in exchange for information.124 Krause 
and Horvitz found that there is a willingness to share personal information in return for gains 
in efficiency in web search. 125  In a questionnaire by Norberg, Horne and Horne on self-
reported disclosure behavior, respondents were asked whether they would provide 
information to a large bank for a $20 incentive. The researchers found that the level of actual 
disclosure significantly exceeded individuals’ intentions to disclose. 126 In addition to these 
surveys, a handful of research experiments performed in the last 20 years revealed consumers’ 
willingness to provide personal information in exchange for benefits. These benefits are 
operationalized as monetary rewards, future time savings, enhancement in quality, or 
personalization.127 In Spiekermann, Grossklags and Berendt’s study into the privacy paradox 
most participants did not live up to their self-reported privacy preferences.128 They displayed 
a surprising readiness to reveal highly personal information to an anthropomorphic 3-D 
online shopping bot. The study indicates that Internet users do not act in accordance with 
their (self-reported) views on privacy. Given the right circumstances online users forget about 
their privacy concerns and communicate even the most personal details. This holds true in 
 
122 http://www.pwc.com/us/en/industry/entertainment-media/assets/pwc-consumer-privacy-and-information-
sharing.pdf. 
123 Deloitte 2014, supra note 83, 8. 
124 Phelps, Nowak and Ferrell, supra note 120, 36-37 (2000).  
125 Krause and Horvitz, supra note 120, 1. 
126 Norberg, Horne and Horne, supra note 123, 118. 
127 Hann, Hui, Lee and Png, supra note 120, 3; Ramnath K. Chellappa and Raymond G. Sin, Personalization 
versus Privacy: An Empirical Examination of the Online Consumer’s Dilemma, 6 Information Technology and 
Management 181, 182 (2005); Krause and Horvitz, supra note 120, 1. 
128 Spiekermann, Grossklags and Berendt, supra note 119, 38. 
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particular when enticing benefits are offered.129  An experiment by Beresford, Kubler and 
Preibusch tested consumer willingness to engage in an exchange of personal information for 
monetary benefits. However, they framed it as the unwillingness to pay for privacy rather 
than the willingness to provide data in exchange for benefits. In their test, subjects had the 
choice to purchase from one of two stores asking for their information. The test was framed 
in such a way that the first store was asking for more sensitive information. That store offered 
a lower price, and more individuals chose to buy from it.130 Grossklags and Acquisti also 
performed an experiment to test individuals’ willingness to sell personal information and 
willingness to protect their personal information. In the second phase of their experiment the 
researchers gave the individuals (who had received $10 of game money) subsequent options 
of selling their personal information for revelation within the group of test subjects or paying 
to protect their information against such revelation. The researchers found that individuals 
almost always chose to sell their information and almost never to protect even for as little a 
price as $0.25. 131 Whereas in this experiment individuals chose to sell their information on 
weight even for as little as $0.25 - $1, in Huberman et al’s experiment on the valuation of 
privacy, individuals had an average demand price of $74.06 dollars for weight information. 
This difference in valuation is probably due to the experiments’ set-ups as well as the 
difference in age range, with the average age in Grossklags and Acquisti’s test around 20 and 
in Huberman et al’s test around 40 years old. 132  Nonetheless, it does show a certain 
willingness to exchange personal information for monetary benefits. 
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The experiments revealed that the right commercial environment can induce a 
remarkable willingness to disclose personal information, which is often higher than what 
would be expected based on consumers’ self-reported privacy concerns. The promise of 
commercial benefits increases the readiness to provide personal information. However, none 
of these experiments directly address the question of how consumers would behave if they 
were fully aware that they are engaging in a trade of personal data for monetary incentives. 
So far as can be ascertained, extensive research into this question has not been done to date. 
In all of the studies cited the purpose of the research (such as testing the privacy paradox, or 
determining the value consumers attribute to personal information) was not communicated to 
participants up front in order to avoid priming. For our research purposes, however, it would 
be interesting to ascertain how consumers behave when they are completely aware that they 
are exchanging personal information for economic benefits, i.e. paying with TPD. If, in a 
situation of perfect knowledge of such an exchange, they would be willing to trade, the 
concept of TPD as a medium of exchange would be viable.  
The premise of this paper is that, if undertaken, such studies would reveal that 
individuals are indeed willing to engage in such trade. Willingness to share personal data 
depends on a few criteria: the type of information, the characteristics of the party whom the 
information is shared with, the knowledge of how the information will be used, and personal 
preferences.133 It is also contingent on the expected returns and the environment in which the 
exchange takes place. 134  The privacy paradox and the notion of immediate gratification, 
discussed above, are important concepts. They imply that most people – even those who say 
 
133 CMA, supra note 81, 109. 
134 Also familiarity with environment/website (Julia B. Earp and David Baumer, Innovative Web Use to Learn 
about Consumer Behavior and Online Privacy, 46(4) Communications of the ACM 81 (2003) but Craig Van 
Slyke, J.T. Shim, Richard Johnson and James Jiang, Concern for Information Privacy and Online Consumer 
Purchasing, 7(6) J. the Association for Information Systems 415 (2006)) and how information is going to be 
used (Krause and Horvitz, supra note 120; Phelps, Nowak and Ferrell, supra note 120, 27; Nadia Olivero and 
Peter Lunt, Privacy versus Willingness to Disclose in E-Commerce Exchanges: The Effect of Risk Awareness on 
the Relative Role of Trust and Control, 25 J. Economic Psychology 243 (2004)). 
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they are concerned with privacy – will be willing to provide personal information, even if for 
small rewards, if these rewards are immediate and thus seem to trump possible downsides 
such as loss of privacy. 135  Indeed, perceptions and attitudes concerning information 
disclosure are changing. Privacy concern is adaptive and context-dependent. 136   Human 
beings look for cues in their environment to make decisions, relying on cultural and context-
bound criteria, as well as the behavior of others. People get used to levels of intrusion, when 
they become more common-place, as illustrated by an experiment in Helsinki on the 
installation of monitoring technology in households.137 The more prevailing the collection of 
data for ‘free’ or discounted services becomes, the more likely it is that individuals will 
willingly engage in an exchange. Human beings are creatures of habit and society. As more 
of human interaction moves to the Internet, where data collection is prevalent in both social 
and commercial exchange, the willingness to disclose is likely to increase. Trepte and 
Reinecke found that individuals who use social network sites (and thus gain social capital) 
show an increased tendency to self-disclose online.138 The more visible it becomes that online 
companies are engaging in data collection, the more normal it starts to become to frequent 
Internet users. This idea is reinforced by the evidence that younger people, who have spent a 
bigger portion of their lives on the Internet, are more likely to disclose personal 
information. 139 According to the 2014 Deloitte survey, consumers aged 15 – 24 are more 
 
135 Tsai, Egelman, Cranor and Acquisti, supra note 119, 256. 
136 Acquisti, Brandimarte and Loewenstein, supra note 119, 511; Norberg, Horne and Horne, supra note 123, 
119. 
137 Acquisti, Brandimarte and Loewenstein, supra note 119, 512; Antti Oulasvirta , Aurora Pihlajamaa, Jukka 
Perkiö, Debarshi Ray, Taneli Vähäkangas, Tero Hasu,  Niklas Vainio and Petri Myllymäki, Long-Term Effects 
of Ubiquitous Surveillance in the Home, Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on Ubiquitous Computing 
(2012).   
138 Trepte and Reinecke, supra note 120, 1109. 
139 See difference in Grossklags and Acquisti’s test versus Huberman et al’s test described above, as well as 
answers in surveys such as PwC’s (Survey, Consumer Privacy: What Are Consumers Willing to Share?(PwC 
The Speed of Life: Consumer Intelligence Series 2012); Avi Goldfarb and Catherine Tucker, Shifts in Privacy 
Concerns, 102(3) Am. Econ. Rev. 349 (2012). 
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trusting of organizations collecting their personal information and more willing to exchange 
information for benefits.140  
3. Data Markets and Other Shifts to TPD 
Privacy perceptions are cultural and shifting. The prevailing approach in Europe of privacy as 
an element of individual dignity and autonomy is not universal. Different cultures have 
different views on what can be kept private and what is part of the public sphere. There are 
two main areas which can lead or stop this shift in perception: commerce and the law. The 
evolution of each with regards to personal data is discussed here.  
The increased use of commercial data-driven services has allowed the view of 
personal data as an economic asset to take root. 141  With the Internet being a global 
phenomenon, privacy as a purely non-commercial concept may be in decline. Discussion 
about property rights over personal data have emerged, with both proponents and critics.142 
Some authors have argued for the attribution to individuals of property rights over their 
personal data.143 A detailed discussion of the legal and philosophical grounds for a property 
right over personal data falls outside of the scope of this research. For the purpose at hand, it 
suffices to acknowledge that such proposals have been put forward and that the discussion is 
on-going. Indeed, property rights over data may be one way to bring consumers’ interests 
more in line with reality. Lanier argues, in his book ‘Who Owns the Future?’ for a system of 
commercial rights over personal data. He envisions a digital future in which individuals will 
 
140 Deloitte 2014, supra note 83, 6 and 8; https://www.ipsos-
mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3422/New-research-finds-data-trust-deficit-with-lessons-for-
policymakers.aspx; Survey, Internet use and attitudes (Ofcom 2012 Metrics Bulletin), available at 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/cmr/cmr12/2012_metrics_bulletin.pdf; Hoofnagle, King, Li 
and Turow, supra note 91, 20. 
141 The Economist, supra note 102,15. 
142 Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, Comm. from the Association for Computer Machinery 92 (1996); 
Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property, 52 Stan. L. 1125 (1999); Paul M. Schwartz, Property, 
Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2055 (2004); Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information 
Property, 52(5) Stan. L. Rev. 1283 (2000). 
143 Marco De Boni and Martyn Prigmore, A Hegelian Basis for Privacy as an Economic Right, Contemp. Pol. 
Theory 168, 169 (2004). 
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derive benefits from allowing organizations to collect and use their data. This could be a 
solution to privacy concerns as ‘some people might choose more privacy and demand so 
much (...) as to make the use of their [photographs] prohibitive.  Most people will choose 
some reasonable, conventional setting.’ 144 His view of the future ties in with the suggestion to 
create, or more precisely expand, information markets where individuals can transfer the 
rights to their personal data to others in exchange for some type of compensation.145 Markets 
for data trade already exist at the level of business-to-business relations. Data brokers, such as 
for example Acxiom, Datalogix or Epsilon, 146 facilitate the trade of personal data between 
companies. Now data trade is also expanding to include consumers directly. Start-ups are 
emerging which want to introduce individuals to the data trade from which they have up till 
now been excluded. A new industry is growing, consisting of ‘Personal Information 
Management Services’ (PIMS), which enable individuals to manage their personal data, and 
use it to personalize services, make better informed decisions, or harness the economic 
benefits of the data trade.147 ‘Personal data lockers’ are giving individuals the ability to store 
their information in one place and control who they share that information with. Data lockers 
are a type of ‘data bank account’, which could be part of a future ‘personal data ecosystem’, 
as envisioned by the World Economic Forum. 148 They allow individuals to store information 
and exchange it with others, in a manner similar to the storage and exchange of money today. 
The concept of personal data lockers is still young, and has sparked a series of intense 
debates.149 But while academics and policy-makers debate, some organizations have started 
 
144 LANIER, supra 9, at 320. 
145 Laudon, supra note 142, 96; Acquisti, Taylor and Wagman, supra note 85, 447; Schwartz, supra note 142, 
2094. 
146 http://www.acxiom.co.uk/; http://www.datalogix.com/; http://www.epsilon.com/emea/ 
147 CMA, supra note 81, 83. 
148 World Economic Forum, Personal Data: The Emergence of a New Asset Class,  9 (2011), available at 
http://gerdleonhard.typepad.com/files/wef_ittc_personaldatanewasset_report_2011.pdf. 
149 https://vimeo.com/14061238; http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2014/june/personal-data-lockers-can-
protect-privacy-and-help-businesses-says-consultant/; http://mdzlog.alcor.net/2011/08/15/building-a-personal-
data-locker/; http://www.facegroup.com/blog/personal-data-lockers-the-future-of-data/; 
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making this vision a reality. They not only provide storage services, but also enable 
individuals to reap the profits of their personal data directly by exchanging TPD for economic 
benefits. Companies such as People.io 150 , HAT151 , Citizenme 152  and Datacoup153  have 
established such services. 154 Datacoup, for example,  provides software that extracts personal 
data from online activities for which the user gives its permission, informing the user which 
information is taken and what value it could have. The user indicates which personal data can 
be sold or exchanged, and receives compensation for this exchange. Right now Datacoup is 
still in its infancy, but as more companies join up as partners, this concept of consumer 
involvement in data exchange may gain traction. The benefits offered in exchange for 
personal data will not necessarily be limited to money either, with data purchasers being able 
to offer discounts or free goods in return for the TPD. 155 People.io takes a slightly different 
approach, offering its customers credits in exchange for their personal data, which customers 
can later redeem for offers or discounts on digital products or services. 156  Both methods 
provide individuals with more control over their personal data, and an opportunity to reap the 
economic benefits of the data trade. 
 In addition to the commercial developments, it is important to acknowledge the 
impact that future data regulation can have on company and consumer behavior. The change 
in businesses’ and consumers’ perception of privacy can be influenced by the approach taken 
by regulators. In theory, regulation may even bring the currently thriving data-driven 
 
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21568438-data-lockers-promise-help-people-profit-their-personal-
information-know-thyself 
150 https://people.io/ 
151 Hub of All Things, hubofallthings.com/main/what-is-the-hat 
152 https://www.citizenme.com/ 
153 https://datacoup.com/ 
154 Other examples include digi.me, https://meeco.me/. A charitable alternative is TheGoodData, a  ‘data co-op’ 
which encourages users to donate the value of their data to charities. 
155 http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/sep/05/datacoup-consumer-sell-data-control-privacy-
advertising; http://www.ozy.com/fast-forward/how-to-take-control-of-your-personal-data/32176; 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/524621/sell-your-personal-data-for-8-a-month/; https://datacoup.com/ 
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commerce to a halt. However, it seems unlikely that regulation will actively halt the 
collection of data, as this is a thriving business and current regulatory proposals seem to want 
to foster it, not nip it in the bud.157 In a global industry reliant on data, it is more realistic to 
regulate the possible use of data after collection, than the collection itself.158 Data protection 
regulation can also have an impact on consumers’ involvement in the personal data 
economy. 159  Regulators can choose to protect consumers, not by putting a stop to data 
collection in general, but by instead empowering consumers through rights to better 
information and increased control.160 If such regulation is established and sensibly applied, 
increased transparency may emancipate consumers by informing them of the use and value of 
their data, the benefits they could reap in a personal data exchange, and their capacity to 
choose not to ‘purchase’ certain services if the ‘price’ is too high. 
All of these developments indicate that the acceptability of TPD as a medium of 
exchange is not so far-fetched. If, in part of the economy, both businesses and consumers 
engage in the trade of TPD for economic benefits – a fact which seems to become 
increasingly likely as time goes on and the industry develops - TPD will gain traction as a 
medium of exchange. This paper puts forward a thought experiment for a future in which 
users are more actively involved in the data economy, and are more sensitive to the amount 
asked of a specific medium of exchange: personal data. 
 
 
157 EU’s new data protection package (Regulation 2016/679 and Directive 2016/680, supra note 40); EU-U.S. 
Privacy Shield (Commission Implementing Decision, of 12 July 2016, pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the 
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IV. PERSONAL DATA IN MARKET DEFINITION 
The conceptualization of personal data in this paper has a specific, and limited, purpose: to 
assess the potential of personal data as a measure of demand-side substitutability. Personal 
data need not become the currency of a whole economy; as long as users of specific online 
services consider that they are providing personal data in return for the service, the amount of 
TPD they are willing to provide could be used as an indication of their choices between 
products.  If TPD is the medium of exchange for free online services, a new avenue to define 
markets for free online services is opened: an analysis of demand-side substitutability through 
the incorporation of TPD as the price. Market definition tests would no longer ask whether 
consumers switch to other products after an increase in monetary price – which the service 
does not charge – but after an increase in TPD. As a thought experiment, the next section will 
integrate TPD into the SSNIP test, and each step of the test will be discussed.  
A. Preliminary Remarks 
Before the discussion of the SSNIP test with TPD, it is necessary to address some underlying 
assumptions which guide this thought experiment. This research concerns a relatively novel 
phenomenon. When working with a new and quickly evolving concept, it is important to be 
aware that future developments may impact the framework constructed around it. These 
developments cannot always be accurately predicted. This certainly holds true for the use of 
personal data by online services. Some developments are assumed as likely for the purpose of 
this paper, such as the continued collection of personal data by online service providers. In 
addition, this paper makes assumptions about the future reactions by companies, regulators, 
and consumers.  
First, this paper works with the expectation that companies will act in accordance with 
data protection regulation, and that data protection regulation will not stifle the data economy. 
If properly drafted and enforced, regulation can increase the involvement of consumers in the 
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data economy. The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which 
will come into force on the 25th of May 2018, imposes consent and information obligations 
on those companies acting as personal data controllers and processors, even when these 
companies are established outside of the EU, if they offer goods or services to individuals in 
the EU.161 If implemented correctly by the companies which fall within its scope, the GDPR 
grants consumers more insight and control over the collection of their personal data.  
Second, as discussed above, this paper assumes that, as consumer involvement in the 
data economy increases, their familiarity with the commercial use of personal data will also 
increase. This would significantly reduce some of the challenges which currently arise from 
the use of TPD as price. One such challenge is that the amount of TPD asked as a price is not 
as easy to recognize as the amount of money asked. When consumers buy an apple in a 
supermarket, they know they will be paying $1 because it says so on the price tag. However, 
when the same consumers purchase services online, the amount of TPD gathered may not be 
as straightforward. As Strandburg puts it, ‘Internet users do not know the “prices” they are 
paying.’ Strandburg is right in arguing that consumers currently lack the extensive market 
experience required for personal data to serve as a price and signal consumer demand.162 This 
would change, however, as they become more familiar with the use of TPD as a medium of 
exchange. Their ability to estimate the value of what they are exchanging would increase. 
Another challenge is that personal data is not purely economic, but also involves privacy 
concerns, even if emphasis on economic ‘control’ rights by consumers over their personal 
data grows. This does not, however, mean that personal data cannot be used as a price, to 
signal consumer demand for products. If enough information is available about the collected 
data, consumers will become able to compare services based on the amount of TPD they have 
 
161 GDPR, supra note 40, Art. 3. 
162 Katherine J. Strandburg, Free Fall: The Online Market’s Consumer Preference Disconnect, 5 U. Chi. Legal 
F. 95, 132 (2013).  
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to provide. The fact that consumers have a certain level of disinclination to allow intrusions 
of privacy may play a part in their consideration of what a reasonable price is. In any case, 
they would be able to choose whether they are willing to use service X or service Y, 
depending on the amount of TPD each requires. Thus, they would be able to signal their 
preferences for one service over another.  
Last, the article assumes that, as the data economy grows, and the participation of 
consumers in B2C exchanges increases, valuation methods for data will be refined and it will 
be possible to ascertain a B2C value of TPD. If this is not the case, the thought experiment set 
out in this article cannot hold. As discussed, the current valuation methods in use focus on 
B2B data trade or in-house valuations of data assets. However, with the growth of the PIMS 
and data locker market, the experience and evidence required to establish a B2C value of 
TPD becomes more readily available. Thus, it seems likely that, if more consumer-focused 
data companies emerge, the B2C valuation of TPD will be possible. This would then 
facilitate the use of personal data in the SSNIP test.  
The paper will now address what a SSNIP test with TPD as a price could look like. It 
is important to remember throughout this discussion that this thought experiment only aims to 
assess the possibility of TPD as a price for market definition. It does not mean to assert the 
feasibility of personal data as a currency in the general economy. That would go beyond the 
scope of this paper, which mainly seeks to provide an alternative method to assess demand-
side substitutability for market definition. 
B. Implementing the Test 
A SSNIP test with TPD as the price would involve asking the following question: ‘If the 
undertaking were to introduce a small but significant increase in the TPD required for the 
service, would customers switch to other services in a manner that makes this price increase 
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unprofitable?’ The test would require three steps. First, a candidate market would have to be 
determined. Second, it would have to be assessed whether a small but significant non-
transitory increase in the price (the TPD asked) would induce consumers to switch to other 
services, making the price increase unprofitable. Third, the market would have to be widened 
or maintained. If no switch takes place rendering the price increase unprofitable, the 
candidate market amounts to the right definition of the market, and will not be widened. If the 
consumers do switch to other services, the candidate market will be widened, and the test 
repeated. The test can be repeated until the answer to the question is ‘no’ – an increase in 
price does not lead to an unprofitable switch by customers. These steps are the same 
regardless of whether the price of a service is rendered in money or TPD. However, there are 
practical implications of using TPD as the price for the test. In order to explore these, each 
step of the test will be discussed separately. A practical example will be used throughout this 
discussion. The SSNIP test will be applied to the hypothetical scenario that a case is brought 
regarding the behavior of a company called FableVideo Ltd. This company offers an online 
service: video streaming within the Fantasy genre. FableVideo offers its services to its 
customers in ‘streams’ of video, which consist of 10 minutes of viewing time. Two other 
companies exist, which also offer video streaming, but of a general nature, without a specific 
genre focus. These are GeneralVideo Ltd. and AllVideo Ltd. Both FableVideo and 
GeneralVideo charge their customers in TPD, whereas AllVideo uses monetary prices. 
1. Increasing the price 
The first step of the SSNIP test consists of choosing the candidate market to which the SSNIP 
test will be applied: that is, the smallest set of products, which will be assumed to be provided 
by the hypothetical monopolist. Usually the candidate market will consist of the products 
offered by the undertaking under review. In our example, an undertaking called FableVideo 
Ltd. offers a theme-specific streaming service, providing customers with streaming video 
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within the Fantasy genre. The candidate market is described Fantasy themed video streaming 
services. The hypothetical monopolist in the test would thus be the only one offering Fantasy 
themed video streaming. 
 
The second step raises interesting questions. In this new iteration of the test, not the 
amount of money, but the amount of TPD required to use the service would be increased, by 
a significant but non-transitory amount. Then it would be assessed whether this increase 
would lead customers to choose another service, to such an extent that the increase would 
turn out to be unprofitable. In our example, the question would be whether consumers would 
switch to other streaming services, if the hypothetical monopolist were to increase the TPD 
asked for 1 stream (a stream consisting of 10 minutes of video). Before it can be determined 
whether, and to which services, consumers switch, it is necessary to take a closer look at the 
price increase. The price increase in the SSNIP test must be ‘small but significant’. The price 
increase must be sufficiently large to induce a response from customers, 163 induce them to re-
evaluate the purchase of the product against other options; but it cannot be so large that there 
is no other possibility than a large change in demand. On both sides of the Atlantic a 5 – 10% 
increase is generally considered small but significant, even though some jurisdictions allow 
for deviations if the factual circumstances call for it.164 In the case of TPD, it can be asked 
whether this somewhat arbitrary percentage can still be considered ‘small but significant’. It 
may be that individuals are less sensitive to increased demands of personal data than they 
would be to higher monetary prices. There is scope for further research here, which could, e.g, 
derive conclusions on this question from past reactions to changes in privacy policies. As 
 
163 U.K. Office of Fair Trading, Competition Law Guideline: Market Definition §2.9 and 3.3. (2004) (hereinafter 
‘OFT guideline’); DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines, supra note 17, 10. 
164 ICN guidelines, supra note 4, 11; EU Comm. Notice Market Definition, supra note 18, §17; OFT guideline, 
supra note 163, §2.9; DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines, supra note 17, 10. 
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such research has not yet been done, this thought experiment proceeds with the traditional 5-
10% increase. 
In addition, it is necessary to determine what constitutes an ‘increase’. An increase in 
the TPD demanded could be two-fold: it could refer simply to an increase in the amount of 
TPD demanded, or it could mean that the data will be used for additional purposes. The latter 
understanding is novel, and peculiar to the idea of TPD as price. Whereas an individual can 
only give and ‘use’ money once, TPD can be given repeatedly and for multiple purposes. The 
question is whether consumers are sensitive, not only to the amount of TPD demanded, but 
also to what is done with the data. Consumers may consider that ‘the price is too high’, for 
example, if data is no longer only sold to targeted advertisers, but also shared with third 
parties. This may be the case, in particular, when the third parties use the information for 
sensitive purposes, like streetcheck, for example, which provides ethnic, cultural and income 
information per street.165 If consumers would indeed change their behavior if the data is used 
for additional purposes, this change in behavior may signal demand-side substitutability. It is 
more straightforward, however, to apply a percentage to a number than to try to ‘significantly 
increase’ certain actions. The sensitivity of to changes in use of data, and the degree to which 
this is quantifiable, is an avenue for further research. This thought experiment continues by 
considering a price increase as an increase in the amount of TPD demanded, not an increase 
in usage. However, even the application of a SSNIP to the amount of TPD is challenging. It 
requires the ability to divide data records into categories of equal value. The possibility of 
doing so depends largely on knowledge of the value of data, an issue addressed in part III. To 
run this thought experiment, the valuations used in the example on page 25 will serve as a 
baseline. 166 
 
165 https://www.streetcheck.co.uk 
166 In part III it was put forward that companies offering data locker or personal information management 
services could lead the way to reaching a ‘B2C market price’ for certain categories of personal data. In that part 
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In our example, a hypothetical monopolist of Fantasy video streaming (like 
FableVideo) collects one record of TPD for each stream (10 minutes of video). The 
categories of TPD and their respective value are as follows: records on location, age, or brand 
preferences are each worth $0.50. Thus, if value of one stream is one record of TPD, the 
monetary value of that stream could be said to be $0.50. Let’s say that customers are paying 
for a 100 minute video (10 streams): they would have to provide 10 TPD records (with a 
value of $5). A SSNIP of 10% would mean that customers have to provide one more TPD 
record. Thus, they would now have to provide 11 TPD records ($5.50) instead of 10 TPD 
records ($5). 
 
In the next step of the test, the reaction of customers to the price increase is gaged. If 
they switch to other services and render the price increase unprofitable, these will be included 
in the market. In our example, customers might switch from Fantasy video streaming to 
general video streaming services, services which are offered by GeneralVideo and AllVideo. 
These companies’ prices are lower than FableVideo’s increased price. This can be understood 
in two ways: either the price is lower because less TPD is asked, or because the monetary 
price asked is less than the value of the TPD collected by FableVideo. In casu, 
GeneralVideo offers general video streaming for less TPD, and AllVideo provides general 
video streaming for a monetary price of lower value. This is an important distinction, 
particular to TPD. It is that companies offer similar online services, and that one company 
charges a monetary price, whereas the other collects TPD. Customers may feel that the TPD 
 
of the paper, the value of certain categories of personal data was translated into credits, which equal certain 
discounts for consumers: Personal data record on customer’s phone brand was worth 10 credits, which had a 
value of $0.50.  
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price is too high, and prefer to pay a lower monetary price. Disregarding the companies who 
charge monetary prices would mean underestimating demand-side substitutability.  
 
If the price increase would be  unprofitable because consumers switch to general 
video streaming services, such as offered by GeneralVideo and/or AllVideo, these services 
need to be included in the market. The market would thus be widened to consist of both 
Fantasy themed video streaming and general video streaming. The next step would be to 
apply the SSNIP again, to this redefined market. If the SSNIP in this redefined market is still 
unprofitable, the test will be repeated. If it is no longer unprofitable, because insufficient 
consumers switch to other services, the relevant market has been found.  
 
2. Profitability and monetary value 
A question which arises is how to assess whether the increase would be unprofitable. A 
critical loss analysis could be performed. Determining the critical loss of the company 
enables the assessment of the profitability of the price increase. If the actual loss is greater 
than the critical loss, because consumers have switched, the increase is unprofitable. In our 
example, this means that, although the profit per stream increases, the loss of output is still 
greater, because fewer customers are obtaining FableVideo’s service. Performing the critical 
loss analysis when the price is in TPD has some interesting features. Applying a critical loss 
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analysis when TPD is the price comes with a challenge. The calculation of critical loss 
requires knowledge of the revenue and gross margin of the company. 167 Costs (which need to 
be known to calculate margin and revenue), such as the maintenance of the database, the 
collection costs, the personnel required and so on, are expressed in money. To know what the 
profit is per unit sold, it may be necessary to express TPD its monetary value. If one unit is 
sold for 10 TPD and the variable costs are $2, then the unit margin will be 10 TPD minus $2. 
In addition, it is not easy to pinpoint what constitutes ‘revenue’ when the price is TPD. In 
B2C trade with a monetary price, the revenue is the amount of money earned from the 
provision of services to consumers. In business models where the service is offered in return 
for TPD, however, revenue could mean two things. Either the TPD itself is the revenue, or it 
is the money received for the sale or license of the TPD to a third party at a later stage which 
constitutes the revenue. If the former is true, and TPD itself is the revenue, much as money is 
in traditional trade, the revenue is assigned by the company at the moment it obtains the TPD.   
If the latter is true, the value is not assigned the moment the B2C transaction takes place, but 
at a later moment in time. In our example, the company was paid in 10 TPD for the service, 
and then later sells the data on for $5. The revenue is the $5 received from the third party. 
Knowing how the company achieves its revenue is important. If the revenue is a consequence 
of trade with a third party at a later date, the value could be quite different than if the TPD 
itself is seen as the revenue. The company may not (or may take a long time to) realize the 
value of the TPD through trade with a third party. External elements may impede the second 
stage of the company’s business practice or shocks in the market may decrease the price the 
third party will be willing to pay. If the third party offers other goods or services in exchange 
for the TPD or the data-driven services offered by the company, the use of that transaction as 
a measure for the revenue may be quite difficult. The challenges in applying a critical loss 
 
167 BISHOP and WALKER, supra note 20, 552; O’DONOGHUE and PADILLA, supra note 20, 111. 
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analysis to TPD limit the use of this test to determine the profitability of the price increase. 
To address this limitation, TPD can, at least at an initial stage, be expressed in monetary 
value. In our example, the monetary value of 10 TPD is $5. Expressing TPD in monetary 
value would enable the calculation of profit per unit (10 TPD at $5, minus $2 in costs, for 
example), and it would facilitate the expression of the revenue derived from TPD. It may, 
however, undermine the full development of TPD as a medium of exchange, if the go-to 
measure remains money. This is a drawback which should be acknowledged, and may lead to 
the reformulation of the way to assess the profitability of price increases.  
 Attributing monetary value to TPD is not just a matter for the critical loss analysis. In 
the hypothetical example of video streaming services, monetary value (B2C market value) 
was used as a proxy for the value of each TPD record. This facilitated setting out the thought 
experiment in a simple and comprehensible manner, in line with the current lack of inherent 
value recognition of TPD. However, if the use of TPD as a medium of exchange develops, 
consumers will automatically recognize TPD as valuable in itself. Services currently exist 
where the user is explicitly asked to accept advertising in return for the service. Zerocopy, for 
example, is a Belgian company enabling students to print their notes without monetary charge, 
but with ads.168 A variation on this could exist, where companies explicitly ask for TPD as a 
payment for an online service. That this is a possible development, was recognized recently in 
the EU’s proposal for a Directive on contracts for the supply of digital content. Recital 13 of 
that proposal states that ‘digital content is often supplied (…) against counter-performance 
other than money, i.e. by giving access to personal data’.169  As consumers become more 
familiar with explicit payments in TPD, they may think of the purchase of such services in 
terms of TPD, not money. The SSNIP test would not, then, require a conversion in money. It 
 
168 Zerocopy.be 
169 Proposal for a  DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on certain 
aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content, COM/2015/0634 final - 2015/0287 (COD). 
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would suffice to increase the amount of TPD collected and monitor consumer reaction. Some 
types of TPD may be recognized as having the same inherent value, and thus be categorized 
in a similar way as in the FableVideo example. The TPD increase could happen within the 
same category of data collected, or could consist of adding data from other categories to the 
collection. It is important to recognize that this is a hypothesis, which has not (yet) come to 
fruition. It is a scenario with some apparent limitations, which would require further research. 
The question whether an increase in purposes should be considered would remain, as would 
the question as to how to measure profitability. The responses of consumers to TPD collected 
as a medium of exchange, and the attribution of value, also provide avenues for further 
studies.  
The use of monetary value as a proxy is not the only choice made in this paper in order to 
facilitate the thought experiment. The example used has been kept relatively simple. It starts 
from the premise that the video streaming companies decide on the amount of TPD required, 
irrespective of consumer choices with regards to the use of the service. In reality, the amount 
of personal data collected by online companies may vary as a result of users’ choices in two 
ways. First, there are circumstances in which the user decides how much information to 
disclose. Indeed, when using social networking services, users can choose what to post and 
share with friends, the public, and the company. The question arises whether this disclosure 
can count as a price. The starting point should be that social information which is not 
monetized by the company, and not part of a conscious value exchange, is not TPD, and can 
thus not be deemed relevant to measure demand-side substitutability. 170 Second, users may 
have a degree of choice with regards to the level of service they purchase through their TPD.  
A service may require a minimum amount of TPD, which is a prerequisite for access to the 
most basic form of the service, whereas it requires more TPD to unlock access to more 
 
170 It seems useful to repeat that the personal data of concern is what has been called ‘TPD’, tradable personal 
data, which is part of a  value exchange. 
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features of the service. For the purpose of this hypothesis, the types of data collected can be 
divided into: 1) TPD which a user needs to provide in exchange for access to the most basic 
form of the service, which can be called the ‘access price’, 2) TPD which needs to be 
provided for the use of extra features of the services, to be called ‘feature prices’, and 3) TPD 
which users voluntarily share with other users of the service, which do not enable extra 
features. The access price is the minimum TPD required for the most rudimentary version of 
the service, used by all, such as person search in a social network. If in accessing more 
features, for example contact options or social recommendations, more TPD will be collected, 
the extra TPD amounts to a feature price. Not all users use all the features of the service, or 
the same features of the service, in a similar way as car shoppers do not purchase the same 
options on a car. The question arises to which categories a SSNIP should be applied: the base 
price alone, the feature prices on their own, a combination of the base price and features, or 
all of these in a specific order. This question, which is closely related to the question how to 
distinguish features from products, will be the subject of further research subsequent to this 
paper. 
V. CONCLUSION 
‘Free’ online services raise problems for market definition, as common methods to define the 
market rely on price to assess demand-side substitutability. If no price can be discerned, 
market definition becomes near impossible. However, ‘free’ does not necessarily mean that 
no ‘price’ is charged. Consumers on the Internet routinely act as providers of an important 
input: personal data. In exchange for the provision of their personal data, consumers obtain 
access to these ‘free’ services. This paper argues that personal data could be the price in these 
transactions. Price is defined as the amount of medium of exchange paid in a transaction, and 
personal data could become that medium of exchange for online service. As users grow more 
aware that the collection of TPD is a condition for the use of online services, they become 
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more sensitive to the amount of personal data demanded. They may then compare services 
based on the personal data demanded, enabling the assessment of demand-side 
substitutability through consumers’ reactions to increases in the TPD demanded. This would 
open up a new way to define the market for online services in the absence of monetary price. 
This paper hopes to spark a debate around the viability of this new approach, by setting out a 
thought experiment on the viability of TPD as a ‘price’ for the purpose of market definition, 
manifested through a rethinking of the SSNIP test, in which the ‘increase in (monetary) price’ 
is replaced by an ‘increase in TPD’. 
 The paper first discussed the requirements TPD (tradable personal data) would have 
to satisfy to be a medium of exchange and thus a price. It is clear that notion of TPD as a 
price is not without its challenges. Money may have benefits as a price that personal data 
does not. Money is an engrained part of society, accepted in the minds of both businesses and 
consumers as a medium of exchange. Its value is uniformly and inherently recognized by the 
economic participants. TPD may not have a similar status. However, it could be a price in 
some transactions if certain conditions are fulfilled. The further growth of awareness and 
acceptability is a prerequisite for the adoption of TPD as a price. The further development of 
technology, society, and regulation will play important roles in the viability of TPD as a 
means of exchange. From the outset, the willingness of consumers to exchange their personal 
data for benefits seems bigger than expected. Studies have revealed that concern for privacy 
is less significant than indicated by consumers’ self-revealed preferences. It seems likely that 
as consumer-oriented data-driven services increase, the awareness and sensitivity of 
consumers will also increase. If consumers are sensitive to demand of personal data for the 
use of services, TPD could be used as a price for the purposes of market definition for free 
online services. The paper provided some thought on implementation of TPD in the SSNIP 
test. Some issues require further research, such as the sensitivity of consumers to increased 
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data collection as opposed to higher monetary prices, which could prompt a re-evaluation of 
the 5-10% increased as the SSNIP benchmark. It would also be interesting to investigate 
whether users are sensitive to increases in the purposes for which data is collected. More 
pressing is the need to ascertain how to value TPD, and to increase the general knowledge of 
when and how much TPD is collected. This knowledge is also needed to assess whether TPD 
as price is a viable method for more complex settings, where the collection of personal data 
depends on the behavior of users, or varies depending on the form of the service used. This is 
research which can only partially be done at this stage, as developments in the area may make 
imminent findings obsolete.  
It is clear that using personal data as a price for the purpose of market definition is not 
without its challenges. Nonetheless, the concept should not be too readily dismissed. 
Although the extent and speed of a future growth in awareness and habit will only reveal 
itself over time, TPD as a price provides an interesting alternative to fall back on when 
quantitative market definition turns out to be difficult because no monetary price is charged. 
Market definition is about the interchangeability of products: would consumers switch to 
another product? Using personal data as a price might answer that question. Research could 
investigate consumers’ responses to demands in personal data in real-life settings.171 Users of 
the App Store Google Play, for example, receive a warning of the type of personal data the 
app they are considering buying would collect. It might be interesting to analyze consumers’ 
reactions on the Google Play store to similar apps with different requirements in terms of 
personal data. If consumers are (or were to become more) sensitive to demand of personal 
data for the use of services, using personal data as a price for the purposes of market 
 
171 A recent draft paper is a  step in that direction. In James C. Cooper, Anonymity, Autonomy, and the Collection 
of Personal Data: Measuring the Privacy Impact of Google’s 2012 Privacy Policy Change, (George Mason 
University Law and Economics Research Paper Series 17-06, 2017) (draft version available on ssrn) the author 
measured actual consumer response to determine whether they would reduce their use of Google for sensitive 
search queries as a result of changes in Google’s privacy policy. 
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definition in the digital economy may be a viable option for market definition when there is 
no monetary price. The SSNIP test is not an exact science. It is an approximation of demand-
side substitutability with the purpose of defining the market to eventually assess whether 
there is significant market power and anti-competitive effects. It should be used with caution. 
Currently, however, it is widely used on both sides of the Atlantic. It is not because one 
element of it (the existence of a ‘price’) seems daunting, that it is time to throw the baby 
away with the bath water. Conceiving of personal data as a price may be a way forward. 
Above all, this paper shows that innovation need not imply the demise of established legal 
principles. With some creative thinking law can be reimagined to fit within a changing 
society. 
